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Human action has to a large extent always been oriented toward the future. 
Since ancient  times, men and women  hoped  to outwit fate and  survive by 
magic divination; they also hoped to outwit nature and others by shrewd cal- 
culation.  Attempts to predict the future, therefore,  are as old as magic, but 
they are also as old as commerce, saving, and investment.  Their motivation 
must always have been largely economic, despite the inevitable frustrations of 
economic forecasting. 
Great foresight in business matters is presumably highly profitable and rare. 
Its possessor will do well to exploit it directly for personal enrichment  and 
hence should not be inclined  to offer its products  to the public in the open 
market. An  economist who perceives  competitive  markets  as working  with 
reasonable efficiency should not expect any forecasts of  stock prices or inter- 
est rates to be both freely traded and consistently much better than average. 
Forecasting  macroeconomic aggregates such as real GNP and its major ex- 
penditure  components is likely to have  less potential for direct profitability 
than forecasting financial variables. Hence, it is presumably less vulnerable to 
that old American adage rebuking expert advisers: “If you’re so smart, why 
ain’t you rich?’  (cf. McCloskey 1988). 
For reasons explained in section  1.1 below, to be interesting  and robust, 
macroforecast  assessments should cover a broad range of  forecasters, vari- 
ables, and economic conditions. The forecasts  must be explicit, verifiable, 
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and  sufficient to allow  a responsible  appraisal.  Unfortunately,  most  of  the 
available time series of  forecasts are short, and none are free of  some gaps, 
discontinuities,  and inconsistencies.  Relying  on a small sample of  specific 
forecasts  from  an  individual  source risks  overexposure  to  isolated  hits  or 
misses due to chance. It is therefore necessary to concentrate on a set of fore- 
casts from numerous and various sources. This is likely to improve the cover- 
age by types of information and methods used as well. 
The way to collect the required data is to conduct regularly, for a sufficiently 
long time and with appropriate frequency, a survey that would be reasonably 
representative of the professional activities of macroeconomic forecasters. A 
joint project of the National Bureau of Economic Research  (NBER) and the 
Business and Economic Statistics Section of the American Statistical Associa- 
tion (ASA) had the purpose of accomplishing just that. The NBER-ASA sur- 
vey  assembled  a large amount  of  information  on the record  of  forecasting 
annual and quarterly changes in the U.S. economy during the period 1968:IV- 
1990:I (eighty-six consecutive quarters). It reached a broadly based and diver- 
sified group of  people regularly engaged in the analysis of  current and pro- 
spective business conditions.  Most of  the economists  who responded came 
from corporate business and finance, but academic institutions, government, 
consulting firms, trade associations,  and labor unions were also represented. 
The forecasts covered a broad range of principal aggregative time series relat- 
ing  to  income, production,  consumption,  investment,  profits,  government 
purchases, unemployment, the price level, and interest rates. The surveys also 
collected data on the methods and assumptions used by the participants and 
on  the  probabilities  that  they  attached  to  alternative  prospects  concerning 
changes in nominal or real GNP and the implicit price deflator. 
The NBER-ASA  data have their shortcomings,  most important of which 
are probably the high turnover of participants and the large frequency of gaps 
in their responses. The data collected represent a mixture of public and private 
predictions.  The survey members, generally  professional  forecasters,  were 
identified  by  code only. Their anonymity helped  raise the  survey response 
rates but may have had otherwise ambiguous consequences (encouraging in- 
dependence of judgment or reducing the sense of individual responsibility?). 
The initiative to develop and maintain the quarterly NBER-ASA survey was 
strongly motivated by the desire to make it “the vehicle for a scientific record 
of economic forecasts” (Moore 1969, 20). The expectation that such a survey 
would be of considerable  service to both the profession  and the public was 
shared by Moore with others who helped implement his proposal (including 
one of the authors of this paper, who had the responsibility  for reporting on 
the  NBER-ASA  survey during the entire period  of  its existence).  In retro- 
spect, it seems fair to say that the assembled data do indeed provide us with 
rich  and in part  unique  information,  which  can help  support much-needed 
research on the potential and limitations of forecasting economic change. 
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riety of sources each quarter add up to a mass of  information about the pro- 
cesses and results of macroeconomic forecasting. Although many studies have 
already used some of this material, much of  it remains to be explored. This 
report is the first to examine all the variables included in the NBER-ASA 
forecasts, for all horizons and over the entire period covered. It concentrates 
on the properties of the distributions of summary measures of error, by  vari- 
able and span of forecast, viewed against the background of descriptive statis- 
tics for the predicted time series. Other subjects of interest include the role of 
characteristics and revisions of “actual” data in the evaluation of the forecasts, 
differences by  subperiod (roughly the  1970s vs. the 1980s), the relation be- 
tween the individual and the group mean or  “consensus” forecasts from the 
surveys, the comparative accuracy of the survey results and predictions with a 
well-known macroeconometric model, and comparisons with forecasts from 
state-of-the-art multivariate and univariate time-series models. 
Section 1.1 of this paper examines some general problems and the history 
of forecast evaluations and surveys. Section 1.2  presents the NBER-ASA data 
and the methods used. Sections 1.3-1.5  discuss the results of the analysis and 
form the core of the paper. Section 1.6  draws the conclusions. 
1.1  The Diversity of Forecasts and Their Evaluation 
1.1.1  Some Reflections on Predictability and Uncertainty 
It can be readily observed that, at any time, predictions of a given variable 
or  event can and in general do differ significantly across forecasters. Indeed, 
modem macroeconomic forecasts display a great diversity, which must be 
taken into account in thinking about how to assemble and evaluate the related 
data. 
Although changes in the economy are predicted primarily to meet the de- 
mand for forecasts by public and private decision makers, they are also pre- 
dicted to test theories and analytic methods and to argue for or  against points 
of policy. Some conditions and aspects of the economy are much more ame- 
nable to prediction than others. Furthermore, individual forecasters differ with 
respect to skills, training, experience, and the espoused theories and ideolo- 
gies. They compete by trying to improve and differentiate their models, meth- 
ods, and products. They respond to new developments in the economy and 
new ways to observe and analyze them. In sum, there are both general and 
specific reasons for the observed diversity of forecasts. 
Comparisons among forecasts that are differentiated in several respects are 
difficult yet unavoidable. The quality of a forecast is inherently a relative con- 
cept. Common standards of predictive performance must therefore be applied 
to properly classified forecasts along each of the relevant dimensions. 
Surely, the main value of  a forecast lies in its ability to reduce the uncer- 
tainty about the future faced by the user. In general, a forecast will perform 14  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
better in this regard the smaller and closer to randomness its errors are. How- 
ever, the value of a forecast depends not only on its accuracy and unbiased 
nature but also on the predictability of the variable or event concerned.  Some 
events and configurations of values are common, others rare. Where the prob- 
ability of occurrence for the forecasting target is high, uncertainty is low, and 
prediction  is easy but  not  very  informative.  Where that  probability  is low, 
uncertainty is high, and prediction is difficult but potentially very valuable (cf. 
Theil 1967). 
For example, total stocks of the nation’s wealth and productive capital nor- 
mally change little from one month  or quarter to the  next,  barring  a cata- 
strophic war or a natural disaster, and so can be predicted with small relative 
errors. Much the same applies to other typically “slow” stock variables such 
as total inventories of goods or monetary aggregates and the overall price level 
(but not in periods of rapid  inflation!). In contrast, income and expenditure 
aggregates  represent  “fast”  flow variables,  some of  which  (e.g., corporate 
profits, investment in plant and equipment, housing starts, and change in busi- 
ness inventories)  are highly  volatile over short horizons  and apt to be very 
difficult to forecast accurately. Rates of change in indexes of  price levels fall 
in the same category. 
There are also situations that are unique or nearly so where no objective or 
subjective probabilities  based  on  past  history  or experience  are believed  to 
apply and where  “true” (nonergodic) uncertainty  rules (as in Knight  1921, 
233). According to Keynes (1936, 149), “Our knowledge of the factors which 
will govern the yield of an investment some years hence is usually very slight 
and often negligible,” yet businesspeople must make decisions to make or buy 
plant and equipment despite this recognized state of ignorance. In economics, 
as in  history,  statistical-stochastic  methods  have  limited  applicability  (cf. 
Hicks  1979; Solow 1985). Forecasters  cannot afford to be deterred by such 
considerations  and assume some predictability  throughout,  never full uncer- 
tainty. 
Across many variables, uncertainty depends on the “state of nature” (more 
explicitly, on the state of  the economy or the phase of  the business  cycle). 
Thus, it is much easier to predict continued moderate growth once it is clear 
that the economy has entered  a period  of  sustained  expansion  than it is to 
predict the occurrence and timing of a general downturn after the expansion 
has lasted for some time and may be slowing down. 
Influential  public  macro  forecasts  could  in  principle  be  either  self- 
invalidating or self-validating. Thus, if the government believes a forecast of 
a recession next year, it might succeed in stimulating the economy so as to 
make the expansion continue. On the other hand, if consumers generally come 
to expect a recession because of such a forecast, individuals may try to protect 
themselves by spending less now and dissaving later when the bad times ar- 
rive. Businesspeople, acting on similar expectations, may reduce investment 
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tions, although individually rational, would collectively help bring about the 
recession no one wants. 
Indeed, an  early theoretical  monograph  on  forecasts of  general business 
conditions concluded, on these grounds, that they cannot be accurate, partic- 
ularly if they are made public (Morgenstern  1928). However, it is not neces- 
sarily true that a known  forecast  must be falsified by agents’ reaction to it, 
even if that reaction does affect the course of events. Conceptually, the reac- 
tion  can be known and taken  into account for bounded  variables related by 
continuous functions (Grunberg and Modigliani 1954).  I  But the public predic- 
tion  can be correct only if  the corresponding private prediction  is correct, 
which of course is often not the case. Forecasting remains difficult whether or 
not  its results are published. The premise  of  a generally  shared belief  and 
confidence in a commonly held forecast is so unrealistic as to deprive theoret- 
ical exercises based on it of much practical interest. 
1.1.2  A Brief History of Forecast Appraisals and Surveys 
Qualitative judgments about contemporary levels of, and changes in, gen- 
eral business activity are among the oldest economic data. A compilation of 
such records provided partial evidence for the NBER work on identifying and 
dating the business cycles of  history (Thorp 1926; Bums and Mitchell 1946). 
A look at these “business annals,” which go back to the  1830s, reminds one 
of the importance of  public perceptions and expectations concerning aspects 
of general economic and financial activity: employment, production,  prices, 
interest rates. 
This expectational  element in the dynamics of economic life has probably 
long attracted  great attention  from students of  current  events and men  and 
women of  affairs.  It did  not much concern those early theorists,  who were 
preoccupied  with problems of long-run  static equilibrium. But some promi- 
nent economists in the classical tradition stressed the role that variations in 
expectations and “confidence” play in business cycles (Marshall), or hypoth- 
esized  the  occurrence  of  sequences of  overoptimism  and  overpessimism 
(Pigou), or attributed to bankers and entrepreneurs predictive errors resulting 
in malinvestments (Hayek). Keynes and some of his later followers elaborated 
on the destabilizing  role of uncertainty. Along with the formal models of in- 
teracting economic processes came the theories of expectation formation, first 
that of adaptive and later that of rational expectations. In the last twenty years 
or so, incomplete information and expectational errors acquired prime impor- 
tance in many models of economists of various persuasions (monetarist, new- 
classical, new-Keynesian). The corresponding literature grew rapidly. 
Lack  of  quantitative  data has long hampered  the progress of  economics, 
1.  Interestingly, Morgenstem’s monograph and Grunberg and Modigliani’s paper are in a sense 
precursors of the contemporary rational expectations models in which behavior follows forecasts 
that are consistent with the assumptions of the models and free of any systematic errors. 16  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
causing empirical work and tests to lag well behind the formulation of theories 
and hypotheses. Numerical data on forecasts and expectations are particularly 
scarce, except for the very recent period of great expansion in economic and 
financial prediction and consulting activities. Hence, the literature on macro- 
economic forecasting has a brief history, although it too has grown rapidly of 
late.2 
The first forecasting services in the United States to gain considerable suc- 
cess date back to the years immediately preceding World War I and the 1920s. 
They used lead-lag relations to predict business-cycle turning points, relying 
mainly on the tendency of stock prices to lead and short-term interest rates to 
lag  business  activity.  The  sequence,  best  known  as  the  Harvard  “ABC” 
curves, had  a basis in theory  and fact, but  it was a crudely oversimplified 
predecessor of the indicator system subsequently developed at the NBER. It 
performed rather well in the period  1903-14  and in the depression of  1920- 
21, and it would have applied generally in recent times as well (cf. Moore 
1969), but the Harvard  service failed to foresee the onset and extent of  the 
Great Depression,  which doomed this and related forecasting efforts. A 1988 
postmortem  study, using the Harvard data and modem vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model techniques, concludes that the large declines in output that fol- 
lowed the 1929 stock market crash could not have been forecast (Dominguez, 
Fair, and Shapiro 1988).’ This, however, is disputed by a very recent paper 
that applies the Neftci sequential analysis method to the Harvard index (Nie- 
mira and Klein 199  1). 
Monthly forecasts from six sources for the period 1918-28  were scored for 
accuracy in Cox (1929), to our knowledge the first methodical appraisal of ex 
ante predictions of U.S. business activity. Cox found evidence of a moderate 
forecasting success despite the poor showing at the 1923-24  recession. 
The earliest compilation of  quantitative macro forecasts,  so far as we can 
tell, was the informal survey conducted since 1947 by Joseph Livingston, the 
late syndicated financial columnist based in Philadelphia. Twice a year he col- 
lected predictions of such variables as industrial production and the consumer 
price index and summarized  the results  in a business outlook column pub- 
lished in June and December. The forecasters were mostly business and finan- 
cial economists, but some academics were also included. The Livingston data 
represent  a unique and valuable source of  information on forecasts for the 
early post-World  War I1 period, and, in the  1970s, they began to be widely 
used in research, primarily on price expectations. But Livingston adjusted his 
published  “consensus  forecasts”  (means of  the collected  individual  predic- 
tions) in an attempt to take into account any large revisions in the actual data 
that may have occurred between the mailing of his questionnaire and the sub- 
2.  The same applies to the literature on microeconomic prediction, which is additionally re- 
3. Forecasts of a Yale service developed by Irving Fisher were not better in 1929 than those of 
stricted by the fact that much of the material on micro forecasts is confidential. 
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mission of his column to the press. Carlson (1977) recalculated the semian- 
nual Livingston forecasts of CPI and WPI inflation rates for 1947-75  from the 
original data so as properly to reflect the timing of  the predictions and the 
information incorporated in them.4 
As quantitative macroeconomic data and forecasts began to accumulate in 
the 1950s and 1960s, valid examinations of the accuracy and properties of the 
latter became  increasingly possible  (Okun  1959; Theil  1961,  1966; Suits 
1962; Stekler 1968). A comprehensive NBER study initiated in  1963 resulted 
in a systematic collection and appraisal of  annual and quarterly, public and 
private, judgmental and econometric forecasts of  important economic aggre- 
gates and indexes as well as such events as business-cycle peaks and troughs 
(Zarnowitz 1967, 1972; Fels and Hinshaw 1968; Mincer 1969; Moore 1969; 
Cole 1969; Evans et al. 1972; Haitovsky, Treyz, and Su 1974). 
In  1968, a regular quarterly survey of  general economic forecasts was es- 
tablished at the initiative of Geoffrey Moore, then president of  the ASA, to be 
conducted cooperatively by the NBER and the Business and Economic Statis- 
tics Section of the ASA.5  This was the first major organized effort to build up 
reliable information about the potential and limitations of  short-term aggre- 
gative economic forecasts, which would provide a broad base for research and 
improvements in this field. The ASA “agreed to carry out the surveys for a 
period  long  enough to  assure  accumulation of  useful  experience and  evi- 
dence,” while the National Bureau “assumed responsibility for the tabulation 
of forecasts, computation of error statistics and other measures, and research 
in  evaluating the results and their analytical implications” (Zarnowitz 1968, 
1-2).  The cooperation was to last twenty-two years. One measure of its suc- 
cess is that, in 1990, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia undertook to 
continue the survey essentially in the same way  as it was conducted by  the 
NBER and the ASA. 
1.2  The NBER-ASA Survey: Characteristics, Measures, and Data 
1.2.1  Coverage 
Table 1.1 identifies each of the variables covered by title, source, symbol, 
Commerce series number, and the form in which we use the data. During the 
period 1968:IV-l981:11 (col. 5), direct forecasts were made for seven nominal 
indicators and three real indicators; also, predictions for GNP in constant dol- 
lars were derived from those for GNP in current dollars and the implicit price 
deflator. During  the  period  1981:111-1990:1  (col. 6), direct forecasts were 
made for six nominal and eleven real variables. Seven major expenditure com- 
4.  Later studies of the Livingston forecasts generally used them as amended by  Carlson, but 
5.  The Business and Economic Statistics Section had long been engaged in producing annual 
many earlier studies suffer from measurement errors in the published group averages. 
surveys of forecasts by its members. Table 1.1  List of Variables Covered in the NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys, 1968:IV-1981:11 
and 1981:III-l99O:I 
Period Covered 
Unit  Series 
Variable (Symbol)  (R or N)*  Sourceh  No.'  68:IV-81:11  81:11I-90:1  Formd 













Gross national product (GNP) 
GNP implicit price deflator (IPD) 
GNP in constant dollars (RGNP) 
Industrial production (IP) 
Unemployment rate (UR) 
Corporate profits after taxes (CP) 
Plant and equipment 
expenditures (PE) 
Private nonfarm housing starts 
(HS) 
Change in business inventories 
(CBU 
Consumer expenditures for 
durable goods (CD) 





b.y. = 100 (N) 
const. $bil (R) 























































%A 13  Nonresidential fixed invenstment 
Residential fixed investment 
Federal government purchases 
State and local government 
Change in business inventories 
Net exports of goods and 
Consumer price index (CPI) 
Treasury-bill rate, 3 month 














const. $bil. (R)  14  I  89 
15  const. $bil. (R)  263 
267  16  const. $bil. (R)  J 
17 
18 
const. $bil. (R)  I  30  J 
const. $bil. (R)  1  255  level  J 












21  5  116  level  J 
‘R  = real; N = nominal; b.y. = base year; a.r.  = annual rate; const. $ = in constant dollars 
hSources  are as follows: 1 = U.S. Department of  Commerce, Bureau of  Economic Analysis; 2 = U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of  the Census; 3 = U.S. Department of  Labor, Bureau of  Labor Statistics; 4  = Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve 
System; 5 = Citibank and U.S. Department of  the Treasury. 
‘As listed in the Business Conditions Digest and the Survey of  Current Business 
“s  used in the computation of  forecast errors. %A = percentage change. 20  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
ponents of real GNP, the consumer price index, the Treasury-bill rate, and the 
corporate bond yield were added to the list; four nominal series (expenditures 
for consumer durables, plant and equipment, and national defense and change 
in business inventories) were dropped. 
The change in 198  1 resulted from new initiatives undertaken by the NBER 
in the preceding year. A special questionnaire mailed to a long list of profes- 
sional forecasters  (both past and present survey participants  and others) col- 
lected much useful information about the reactions to the design and uses of 
the  NBER-ASA survey,  the  improvements  suggested, and the assumptions 
and procedures favored. There was strong sentiment for expanding the survey 
by  including  several additional  variables.  The problem  was how to comply 
with these wishes without either losing the essential continuity or overloading 
the survey and risking discouraging  future participation.  An advisory com- 
mittee helped make the desirable changes.6 
A large number of individuals participated in the earliest surveys, but many 
were not prepared  to fill out a detailed questionnaire  each quarter and soon 
dropped out. Of the more than 150 people who responded to the survey at one 
time or another, many did so only sporadically, and some submitted incom- 
plete questionnaires. To exclude such occasional forecasters,  we decided to 
use only the responses of those who answered at least ten surveys, providing 
information  for most variables and horizons. Note that the surveys need not 
be consecutive; had we required long records of uninterrupted  participation, 
few respondents would have qualified. 
Table  1.2 shows how this  selection  was accomplished  and with what re- 
sults. Using the forecasts of spending on consumer durables for 1968-81,  the 
number of respondents fell from a total of 156 to eighty-six in the sample, but 
the average number of surveys covered per respondent was greatly increased 
(e.g., doubling from eleven to twenty-two, according to the medians).  The 
average number of  respondents per survey was reduced only slightly, remain- 
ing above forty. The variability of coverage over time was lowered consider- 
ably throughout (cf. cols. 1 and 2). 
The participation  rates in the surveys were much smaller in  1981-90  than 
in  1968-8 1. In terms of the forecasts of real nonresidential  investment,  the 
number of respondents fell from a total of seventy-four to twenty-nine in the 
sample. Again, however,  the selection  process  achieved relatively good re- 
sults. The retained  forecasters  averaged  about  twenty  surveys,  more than 
double the number for all survey participants. The median number of surveys 
covered per respondent  declined only slightly, from twenty-one to eighteen. 
6.  The committee was established with the support of  the Business and Economic Statistics 
Section of the ASA and its 1980 and 1981 chairs, Arnold Zellner and George Tiao. The members 
included Rosanne Cole, Ray C. Fair, Edgar R.  Fiedler, Albert A. Hirsch,  F.  Thomas Juster, 
Geoffrey H. Moore, George L. Perry, W.  Allen Spivey, and Victor Zarnowitz. For more detail on 
these initiatives, see Zamowitz (1982, 11-13). 21  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
Table 1.2  NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys, All Forecasts and 
Sampled Forecasts: Selected Distributional Statistics, 1968-90  and Two 
Su  bperiods 
1968:1V-198 I :I1  I98 I :III-1990:1  1968:IV-1990:1 
All  Sample  All  Sample  All  Sample 
Row  Statistic  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Number of Surveys 
1  Total number 
2  Mean 
3  Standard deviation 
4  Median 
5  Interquartile range 
6  Maximum 
7  Minimum 
Surveys per respondent: 
51  51  35  35  86  86 
14.8  24.2  10.3  20.8  21.0  28.5 
13.0  10.4  9.9  7.5  16.1  13.5 
I1  22  6  20  12  25 
21  18  14.8  9.5  26  21 
46  46  35  35  70  70 
1  10  1  10  I  10 
- 
8  Total number  I56 
Respondents per survey: 
9  Mean  45.8 
10  Standard deviation  14.5 
I1  Median  44 
12  Interquartile range  24 
13  Maximum  86 
14  Minimum  22 
Number of Respondents 
86  74  29  159  111 
40.8  21.7  17.2  39.0  36.8 
11.3  5.9  3.3  15.9  14.1 
42  21  18  37  34.5 
16  10  6  26.2  22.5 
61  33  22  78  67 
20  10  9  12  12 
Nore: The counts refer to the forecasts one and two quarters ahead for the following variables: 1968:IV- 
1981:II (51 surveys),  consumer  expenditures  for durable goods  (CD); 1981:111-1990:1  (35 surveys), 
nonresidential  fixed  investment  (NFI);  1968:IV-1990:1  (86 surveys),  unemployment  rate  (UR). The 
sample includes the forecasters who participated in at least  10  surveys in terms of these observations 
(see row 7). 
Here, too, the relevant dispersion measures were all substantially reduced (cf. 
cols. 3 and 4). 
Finally, the sample for the total period 1968-90,  based on forecasts of the 
unemployment rate, consists of 11  1 out of a total of  159 people. The coverage 
of  surveys per respondent ranges from ten to seventy, with a mean of  about 
twenty-eight; the corresponding figures for respondents per survey are twelve 
to sixty-seven and thirty-seven. Here the dispersion statistics show relatively 
small declines in the transition from “all” to “sample” (cf. cols. 5 and 6). All 
in all, the turnover among the survey participants was  considerable, which 
should be remembered when looking at the results of our study.’ 
7.  Missing observations  (gaps in response) limit our ability to  use these data to study such 
problems as the dependencies over time in the forecast errors (but see Zarnowitz 1985, sec. 3). 22  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
Table 1.3  Percentage Distributions of Respondents by Primary Affiliation: Four 
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1968  I970  1975 












































9  Total presentc  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
(84)  (46)  (47)  (30) 
“As reported by  the participants in the given survey (those who did not respond to the question 
on primary affiliation are excluded). 
bIncludes a very  few responses from labor union  and trade association economists, but mainly 
“not elsewhere classified,” i.e.,  not included in the categories listed above. 
‘Total number of respondents is listed in parentheses. The component percentages may not add 
up exactly to 100.0 because of rounding. 
1.2.2  Forecasters’ Affiliations and Methods 
In  1968-80,  the questionnaire asked  the  participating  forecasters  about 
their primary affiliation, but later the question was dropped. As illustrated in 
table  1.3, academic economists represented  on average about 7 percent and 
government economists about 8 percent of the membership  (rows 5 and 6). 
All other respondents, except for a few from labor unions and trade associa- 
tions, came from the business  world. Most of  the time, manufacturing  ac- 
counted for at least one-third and up to 40 percent of the participants,  com- 
mercial  banking and other financial  institutions  for one-fifth  or more and 
consulting and research firms also for 20 percent or more in 1975-80,  less in 
earlier years (rows 1-4). 
These distributions resemble those for the universe of  business forecasters 
as represented by the respondents to the annual economic outlook surveys of 
the National Association  of Business Economists (NABE) in 1975-89.  Here 
from one-third to more than 40 percent of respondents were in the industrial 
economy (manufacturing, energy, utilities), 25-30  percent in finance, 12 per- 
cent or more in consulting and research, 4 percent in other private services, 
and 6-12  percent in government and academe. The assessments of  some of 23  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
the NABE surveys looked for but found no systematic differences in forecast- 
ing performance between these industry groups.* 
Another question asked regularly through 198 1 concerned the relative im- 
portance assigned by  survey participants to each of several items on a short 
list of forecasting methods or tools. Business economists use a variety of pro- 
cedures to predict the major expenditure components of GNP, combine these 
predictions in nominal and real terms, and check and adjust the resulting fore- 
casts for consistency with logic, theory, and the currently available informa- 
tion. This “informal GNP model” is an eclectic and flexible approach in which 
a major rule is played by the forecaster’s judgment (Butler and Kavesh 1974). 
Over 70 percent of the NBER-ASA survey respondents reported using it, and 
over 50 percent on average ranked it first (table 1.4, col.  1). About one-fifth 
of the group favored econometric models, whether their own or outside, and 
one-fourth had their own econometric models (not necessarily comprehensive 
and first ranked). Users of outside models accounted for more than 40 percent 
of the early members and more than half of those in the late 1970s and early 
1980s (cols. 2 and 3). 
Leading indicators were employed by about 70 percent of the survey mem- 
bership in 1968-70, but later that share declined to closer to 50 percent. They 
were ranked second by most respondents. Similar majorities referred to antic- 
ipations surveys,  which  generally  were given  lower ranks.  Other methods, 
such as time-series models,  were specified by  fewer than 20 percent  of the 
participants and preferred by about half of them (cols. 4-6). 
These findings leave no doubt about one point, namely, that the listed meth- 
ods were predominantly used in  various combinations.  Very  few individuals 
preferred any one method to the exclusion of others. Presumably, there is a 
good reason for this in that the different methods tend to complement each 
other, For example, new readings on monthly cyclical indicators and the latest 
results from an investment or consumer anticipations survey may be used to 
modify forecasts from econometric models or the informal approach. 
There seems to be little or no systematic relation between the forecasters’ 
rankings of  the methods and the accuracy of  their predictions,  allowing for 
the difference  between the targeted variables, spans, etc. This is suggested by 
cross-sectional (survey-by-survey) regressions of individual forecast errors on 
dummy variables representing the first-ranked methods as well as by compar- 
isons of properly  standardized average errors over time (Zarnowitz 1971; Su 
and Su 1975). The lower panel in table 1.4 (rows 5-8)  presents average root 
mean square errors (RMSEs) for groups classified by their self-declared meth- 
odological preferences.  These measures are based on a large number of indi- 
vidual forecasts of rates of change in nominal GNP and real GNP (RGNP), 
8. We are indebted to David L. Williams, secretary-treasurer of the NABE, for help in collect- 




Informal  Leading  Anticipations  Other 
GNP Model  Own  Outside  Indicators  Surveys  Methodsa 
Row  Statistic  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
2  % ranking first‘  55  11  9  11  2  8 
3  % ranking second  13  7  15  29  21  4 
4  % ranking lower‘  6  7  25  22  35  4 
1  % using’  75  24  48  62  57  16 
Average Root Mean Square Error 
5  GNP,‘% change  .96  1.09  .89  1  .oo  .99  1.15 
6  RGNP, % change  1.14  1.25  1.05  1.24  1.22  1.27 
7  IPD, % change  .71  .76  .72  .79  .85  .83 
8  UR, level  .58  .66  .52  .62  .71  .59 
’A “write-in” response but often not specified. 
bBased on seven surveys 1968:IV-1970:11 (496 replies), six surveys 1974:1-1975:11  (308 replies), and six surveys 1980:I- 
1981:II (187 replies).  The August 1969 survey was held in connection with the ASA annual meeting and attracted a very 
large number of respondents (128, including 46 regular panelists).  Participation in the other surveys covered varied from 
24 to 83. The averages are weighted according to the numbers of the replies. 
‘Most important. 
dRanks  third to sixth (least important). 
‘According to first-ranked method (ties for the first rank are not included). Refers to 79 individuals who participated in at 
least 12 of  the 46 quarterly surveys in the period from 1968:lV through 19803. For more detail, see Zarnowitz (1983). 
‘Symbols are defined in table 1.1. 25  Twenty-two Years of  NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
IPD (implicit price deflator) inflation, and the levels of  the unemployment 
rate; they omit occasional forecasters and aggregate across predictions for the 
current quarter and three quarters ahead. The differences between the RMSEs 
are generally small and of uncertain signifi~ance.~ 
1.2.3  Basic Measures of Error in Forecasts of Changes and Levels 
For series with upward trends, for example, GNP in current and constant 
dollars and the implicit price deflator, the most relevant forecasts are those of 
percentage change. Let the current survey quarter and the four quarters that 
follow be denoted by  t  = 1,  . . . ,  5, respectively. The most recent quarter 
for which data are available precedes the date of  the survey (t = 0).  Then 
the predicted average changes refer to the spans 0-1,  0-2,  . . . ,  0-5,  and 
the implied marginal (or intraforecast) changes refer to the spans 0-1,  1-2, 
. . . ,4-5. 
For approximately stationary series such as the unemployment rate, real 
inventory investment, and real  net  exports,  the most relevant forecasts are 
those of levels in the original units. They refer to quarters 1, . . . ,  5. 
Our data consist of  more than  17,000 individual time series of  forecasts 
defined by source, variable, and horizon. For example, for 1968-90, there are 
11  1  respondents in our sample, reporting on seven variables over five spans 
each, yielding 3,885 series (= 11  1  X  7  X  5; however, consideration of four 
marginal changes for five of these variables adds another subset of 2,220 se- 
ries).  The tables presented below record the distributions of  the  summary 
measures of error across these individual series for each variable, period, and 
horizon covered. We  distinguish three measures-the  mean error (ME), the 
mean absolute error (MAE), and the root mean square error (RMSE)-and 
compute several location and dispersion statistics for each. These statistics 
include means, standard deviations, medians, interquartile ranges, skewness, 
and kurtosis (denoted by  M, SD, MD, IQR, SK, and KU, respectively). Not 
all the detail of  this compilation can be presented here, of  course, but it is 
available for purposes of verification and further research. 
1.2.4 
Some of the variables covered by the surveys, such as the consumer price 
index and the interest rates, are subject to few or no revisions. Others, notably 
the aggregates and indexes taken from the national income and product ac- 
counts (NIPAs), are revised frequently, and some of  the revisions are large. 
An old but still controversial issue is which revision or vintage of  such data 
should be used in evaluating the accuracy of  forecasts. The preliminary fig- 
ures are most closely related to the latest figures that were available to the 
Data Revisions and Forecast Accuracy 
9. Most of these differences actually disappear when rounded off to one decimal point. Provid- 
ing detail by span of forecast and for some other variables would not alter the picture significantly 
(see Zamowitz 1983, 84-85).  However, it is probably worth noting that the group ranking first 
the outside econometric models had the smallest average RMSEs for most variables (col. 3). This 
group included large companies using well-known econometric service bureaus as well as their 
own staffs of professional economists. 26  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
forecasters, but they may themselves be partly predictions or “guesstimates” 
and may seriously deviate from “the truth,” as represented by the last revision 
of the data. On the other hand, the final data may be issued years after the 
forecast was made and may incorporate major benchmark revisions. That the 
forecasters should be responsible  for predicting all measurement errors to be 
corrected by such revisions is surely questionable. 
Appraisals  of forecasts differ: Some are based on early data (e.g., Zamo- 
witz  1967), others  on  late  data,  generally  prebenchmark  revisions  (e.g., 
McNees  1979; Zamowitz  1985). Judgmental  forecasts  that rely  heavily  on 
recent  preliminary  figures  may  look best  when  compared with  early  data; 
econometric model forecasts that incorporate long series of revised data may 
be more favored by evaluations using later vintages. 
For the NBER-ASA percentage change forecasts of GNP, RGNP, and IPD, 
table 1.5 shows the MAEs and RMSEs obtained by comparisons with fifteen- 
day, forty-five-day, early July, and late July data. In general, and with excep- 
tions, the errors tend to increase monotonically the more revised the data are. 
However, the differences between the successive error measures in each seg- 
ment and column of the table are relatively small, typically less than 0.1 per- 
cent. This is fortunate because it suggests that the choice of which vintage of 
the data to use may not be so critical. Even so, larger differences may occur 
in particular  subperiods  and offset each other over the total period covered. 
Our results certainly do not detract from the importance of measurement er- 
rors in the forecasting context, which has been demonstrated to be large (Cole 
1969). 
To save space and avoid relying on the extremes of either very preliminary 
or repeatedly revised data, we shall henceforth use the forty-five-day estimate 
in most of our text references and all tabular presentations. But no single data 
vintage is an optimal standard here; the choice of  any is inevitably  more or 
less arbitrary and too restrictive. 
1.3  Forecasts of Nominal and Real GNP Growth and Inflation 
1.3.1  Graphic Comparisons of  Predictions 
A  convenient  way  to relate  the distributions  of  survey  forecasts  and the 
actual data visually is to plot the former in the form of box diagrams and the 
latter as a continuous series, quarter by quarter, to common scales. Figures 
1.1-1.3  apply this device to predictions of  nominal and real GNP growth and 
IPD inflation rates. There is one graph  for each variable and horizon.  The 
midpoint of each box marks the location of  the group’s mean forecast; the top 
and bottom  mark the mean plus or minus one standard deviation.  A longer 
vertical line bisects each box and connects the highest and lowest forecasts 
recorded on the same occasion. A heavy curve superimposed on the array of 
the boxes and vertical lines represents the actual outcomes (forty-five-day es- 
timates). 
The graphs make it clear that  the  curves  cross most  of  the  boxes.  This Table 1.5  Mean Absolute Errors and Root Mean Square Errors of Forecasts of Nominal and Real GNP Growth and Inflation: 
Comparisons with Different Vintages of Target Data, 1968-90 
Mean Absolute Errors by Span (Qs)~  Root Mean Square Errors by Span (Qs). 
Row  Vintage of  0-1  0-2  0-3  0-4  0-5  0-1  0-2  0-3  0-4  0-5 
Actual Dataa  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Gross National Product (GNP) 
1  15-day  .59  1.08  1.55  1.92  2.36  .77  1.41  2.03  2.54  3.13 
2  45-day  .62  1.12  I .60  I .99  2.48  .86  I .45  2.07  2.58  3.20 
3  Early July  .65  1.15  1.65  2.02  2.54  .85  I .48  2.10  2.60  3.26 
4  Late July  .69  1.17  1.66  2.03  2.52  .89  1.50  2.10  2.60  3.23 
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP) 
5  15-day  .61  1.06  1.51  1.96  2.44  .81  I .40  2.04  2.70  3.35 
7  Early July  .67  1.09  1.57  1.99  2.46  .88  I .44  2.07  2.69  3.33 
6  45-day  .64  1.09  I .56  2.00  2.47  .85  I .44  2.08  2.74  3.38 
8  Late July  .68  1.11  1.58  2.01  2.48  .90  I .44  2.05  2.66  3.30 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) 
9  15-day  .40  .71  1.07  1.49  1.98  SO  .92  1.37  1.92  2.56 
10  45-day  .42  .77  1.16  1.63  2.14  .54  .99  1.50  2.10  2.79 
II  Early July  .42  .77  1.18  1.66  2.17  .53  .99  1.52  2. I4  2.83 
12  Late July  .41  .79  1.21  1.70  2.21  .53  .99  1.53  2.16  2.84 
a15-day: preliminary data released in the month following the target quarter of the forecast. 45-day: revised data released a month later. Early July: generally 
first July revision; where this is not available, the preceding  revision. Late July: generally second July revision; where this is not available, the preceding 
revision. 
bMean of the MAEs of the individual forecasts, where MAE = l/N 1  1  E, 1;  E, = P, -  A,; P, = predicted value; A, = actual value of the given vintage. The 
average errors refer to percentage changes from quarter t - 1 (0) to quarters t,  f  +  1, t  + 2, f  + 3, and t  + 4 (I, 2, 3, and 4), respectively, where t refers to 
the quarterly date of the survey. Thus, 0-1  denotes the change from quarter t - 1 to quarter t, 0-2  denotes the change from quarter f - 1 to quarter f + I, 
etc. All measures refer to percentage change errors and are given in percentages. 
‘Mean of the RMSEs of  the individual forecasts, where RMSE  = Vlin  Z (P, -  A,). 28  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
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Fig. 1.1 
GNP,  three horizons, 1968:IV-1990:1 
Forecast distributions  and actual values of percentage changes in real 
H 
M+SD 
M  H = high; M  = mean;  SD = standard deviation;  L = low. 
M-SD 
L 
means that the realizations  fall within one standard deviation of  the mean or 
“consensus”  predictions  most of  the time.  However,  some large declines in 
actual values are widely missed or underestimated, such mis- or underestima- 
tions showing up as boxes lying conspicuously above the troughs or valleys in 
the curves. Similarly, widespread underpredictions of  some large actual rises 29  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
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Fig. 1.2  Forecast distributions and actual values of percentage changes in 
IPD, three horizons, 1968:IV-l990:1 
show up as boxes situated below the local peaks for concentrations of  high 
values. Occasionally, the actual outcome would be missed by all respondents 
to the survey, as seen in instances where the entire vertical line of  forecasts 
lies above or below the curve. 
These errors are clearly associated with business cycles. Figure 1.1 shows 
clusters of  large overestimates of  real GNP growth in all major slowdowns 
and recessions covered:  1969-70,  1973-74,  1981-82,  and  1985-86.  It also 
shows clusters of  large underestimation errors in all recoveries and booms: 
1972, 1975, late 1980, 1983-84,  and 1987. So overprediction of  growth oc- 
curs mainly when the economy weakens and declines, underprediction when 
it rises strongly. Both types of  error can be seen as particularly pronounced 30  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
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Fig. 1.3  Forecast distributions and actual values of percentage changes in 
nominal GNP, three horizons, 1968:1V-1990:1 
and persistent in forecasts with longer spans. Overall, the errors of  overpre- 
diction in bad times tended to be larger than those of underprediction  in good 
times. 
Figure 1.2 shows that inflation was at times widely underpredicted in 1969- 
71, even  though  it  was  then  fairly  stable.  In  1973-74,  a period  of  supply 
shocks and deepening recession, inflation rose sharply and was greatly under- 
estimated by  most  survey participants.  Here the curves can be  seen to rise 
above most of the boxes and even to peak above the highest forecasts for the 
longer horizons.  The same tendency to underpredict also prevailed in  1976- 
80, although in somewhat weaker form. In this period,  inflation rose more 31  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
gradually,  while the economy  first expanded vigorously  and then,  in  1979- 
80, experienced another oil shock, a slowdown, and a short recession. In be- 
tween, during the recovery of 1975-76,  inflation decreased markedly and was 
mostly  overestimated.  Another,  much longer disinflation  occurred in  198  1- 
85, a phase that followed the shifts to a tight monetary policy in late 1979 and 
included the severe 1981-82 recession and then a strong recovery. Here again 
most  forecasters are observed to overpredict inflation.  Finally, in  1986-89, 
inflation, which began to drift upward, was generally well predicted most of 
the time (except in the mid-quarter of 1987, when it dipped suddenly and was 
overestimated). 
In sum, there is also a cyclical pattern  to the errors of  inflation forecasts. 
Accelerated inflation was associated predominantly with underprediction, dis- 
inflation with overprediction errors. 
Figure 1.3, which compares the forecast distributions and actual values for 
nominal GNP growth rates, shows a broad family resemblance to the corre- 
sponding graphs for real GNP growth in figure 1.1. For example, both nomi- 
nal and real growth tended to be underpredicted in such boom years as 1972 
and 1983 and overpredicted in such recession years as 1974 and 1981-82.  But 
inflation expectations and their relation to real growth forecasts are also im- 
portant here. Predictions of nominal GNP are often helped by inverse corre- 
lations between the changes in IPD and RGNP and the associated offsets be- 
tween  the  forecast  errors for the  two  variables.’O Thus, in  the  inflationary 
recession of 1973-74  associated with the first occurrence of major supply and 
oil shocks, real growth was overpredicted and inflation underpredicted. The 
reverse combination of too low RGNP and too high IPD forecasts can be ob- 
served in the recoveries of  1974 and  1983-84.  However, there are also epi- 
sodes of positive correlation; for example, in 1981-82,  both real growth and 
inflation were overpredicted, which resulted in nominal growth forecasts that 
turned out much too high. 
1.3.2  Distributions of Summary Measures of Error 
Table  1.6 presents the statistics on the distributions of  the mean errors in 
the sampled NBER-ASA survey forecasts of GNP, RGNP, and IPD. For the 
forecasts of average changes in GNP, the means are all negative, but the cor- 
responding medians have mixed signs. The averages for the marginal change 
errors are predominantly positive. The dispersion measures (SD and IQR) are 
very  large relative  to the averages.  Thus, these statistics (rows  1-4)  fail to 
show clearly any dominant  under- or overprediction bias.  Similar observa- 
tions can be made about the real GNP forecasts (rows 7-10).  However, under- 
estimation errors definitely prevail in the inflation (IPD) forecasts. Here all the 
averages, M and MD, are negative, and the relative size of the corresponding 
AD and IQR figures is less. 
10. This has been noted before, in Zarnowitz (1979, 15). Table 1.6  Distribution of Mean Errors in Individual Forecasts  of Nominal and Real GNP  Growth and Inflation, 1968-90 
Average Errors by Span (Qs)  Marginal Errors by Span (Qs) 
0-1  0-2  0-3  0-4  0-5  1-2  2-3  3-4  4-5 




















Standard deviation (SD) 
Median (MD) 
Interquartile range (IQR) 
Skewness (SK) 
Kurtosis (KU) 
Gross National Product (GNP) 
-  .09  -.I1  -.I1  -.I4  -  .30  -  .01  .01  .04  .08 
.26  .56  .91  1.19  1.61  .31  .38  .36  .37 
-  .05  -  .06  .04  .I5  .oo  .01  .06  .09  .13 
.24  .48  .72  .91  1.30  .27  .29  .31  .31 
-1.94  -1.57  -1.60  -2.65  -2.78  -.55  -1.41  -1.64  -1.92 
12.14  12.42  11.90  12.81  13.80  10.89  8.49  8.50  8.66 
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP) 
Mean (M) 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Median (MD) 
Interquartile range (IQR) 
Skewness (SK) 
Kurtosis (KU) 
-  .01  .09  .25  .45  .48  .I0  .I6  .22  .28 
.24  .48  .77  1.06  1.39  .29  .35  .34  .43 
-  .oo  .I3  .34  .62  .64  .I0  .20  .27  .29 
.27  .46  .69  .98  1.20  .28  .36  .38  .51 
4.64  6.76  7.29  7.51  8.13  4.78  6.63  4.24  1.97 
-1.30  -1.58  -1.84  -2.04  -2.06  -1.17  -1.75  -1.34  -  .89 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) 
Mean (M) 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Median (MD) 
Interquartile range (IQR) 
Skewness (SK) 
Kurtosis (KU) 
-  .07  -.I9  -  .36  -  .57  -  .65  -.12  -.I5  -  .I9  -  .21 
.I6  .34  .57  .83  I .24  .20  .25  .27  .35 
-  .07  -.I7  -  .34  -  .54  -  .74  -.I1  -.I4  -.I6  -  .21 
.I5  .39  .75  1.09  1.79  .27  .35  .36  .52 
.06  .32  .09  .I4  -  .06  .28  -.I0  .26  -  .04 
1.35  .76  SO  .92  -.I1  .42  .36  1.91  -  .24 
Nore: Columns  1-5  refer to the errors in forecasts of average changes; cols. 6-9  refer to the errors in forecast of  marginal changes (for 0-1,  the average and marginal 
changes are the same). ME, SD, MD, and IQR  (rows  1-4,  7-10,  and  13-16)  are in  percentage points; entries for SK and  KU (rows 5-6,  11-12,  and  17-18)  are 
dimensionless ratios. IQR  = Q3 - QI is the difference, third quartile minus first quartile of  the distribution (where MD  = QJ.  SK = ka/u3  is the ratio of  the third 
moment around the mean to the third power of the standard deviation SD = u.  KU = b4/a4  is the ratio of the fourth moment around the mean to the fourth power of  SD. 33  Twenty-two Years of  NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
The M and MD statistics tend to increase monotonically in absolute value 
with the length of the span, strongly for the forecasts of average change, less 
so for those of the marginal change. For each of three variables, the SD and 
IQR statistics tend to be much larger the longer the span and the more remote 
the forecast target (cf. rows 1-4,7-10,  and 13-16). 
There is evidence that the distributions for GNP and RGNP are skewed to 
the left (i.e., SK < 0),  with medians larger than the means. For IPD, SK is 
very small throughout, and M and MD are very close (cf. rows 5, 11, and 17). 
The distributions for GNP and RGNP show larger values for kurtosis, indi- 
cating the presence of long, thick tails (for the normal distribution, KU = 3). 
Again, the situation is very different for IPD, where the KU statistics are very 
low (cf. rows 6, 12, and 18). 
Tables 1.7 and 1.8, each of which has the same format as table 1.6, show 
the distribution  statistics for  the  mean  absolute errors and the root  mean 
square errors, respectively. The RMSEs are, of course, larger than the corre- 
sponding MAEs, and the statistics in table 1.8 are generally larger than their 
counterparts in table  1.7 (e.g.,  they  are on average about  30-60  percent 
higher for the GNP measures). Otherwise, the two sets have very similar char- 
acteristics, which can be summed up as follows. 
For both the MAEs and the RMSEs of the individual forecasts, the means 
and  medians  increase  with  the  span  regularly,  strongly  for  the  average 
changes, less so for the marginal changes. The main reason is that errors cu- 
mulate over time, but it is also true that the more distant target quarters are 
predicted somewhat less accurately than the near ones. The dispersion statis- 
tics SD and IQR also increase as the forecast horizon lengthens, except for the 
marginal IPD errors. 
SK is greater than zero everywhere here, and the SK statistics are generally 
large for GNP and RGNP but small for IPD. Consistently, the MDs tend to be 
smaller than the MEs. The distributions tend to be skewed to the right. 
Several of the KU statistics for GNP and RGNP are quite large. Little kur- 
tosis is observed in the IPD forecasts, except for the shortest ones. 
We  conclude that the survey respondents tended to underestimate inflation 
but not (or, in any event, much less) the nominal and real GNP growth rates. 
The IPD forecast distributions were more nearly symmetrical and had fewer 
outliers than the distributions for GNP and RGNP. 
1.3.3 
Combining corresponding forecasts that come from different sources or use 
different techniques tends to produce significant gains in accuracy. This is by 
now  well known from many studies, including some based on the NBER- 
ASA  surveys.l'  In what follows, we extend and update the evidence on this 
point. 
Individual versus Group Mean Forecasts 
11. See Zarnowitz (1984), which uses the  data for  1968-79.  An  early  demonstration that 
simple averaging can reduce forecast errors is in Zarnowitz (1967, 123-26).  For a survey of the 
literature, see Clemen (1989). Table 1.7  Distribution of Mean Absolute Errors in Individual Forecasts of Nominal and Real GNP Growth and Inflation, 
1968-90 
Row  Statistic 
Average Errors by Span (Qs)  Marginal Errors by Span (Qs) 
0-1  0-2  0-3  0-4  0-5  1-2  2-3  3-4  4-5 



















Gross National Product (GNP) 
Mean (M) 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Median (MD) 
Interquartile range (IQR) 
Skewness (SK) 
Kurtosis (KU) 
~~  ~ 
.62  1.12  1.60  1.99  2.48  .76  .84  .85  .88 
.23  .43  .64  .81  1.12  .22  .23  .23  .26 
.56  1.02  1.49  1.84  2.31  .73  .81  .82  .86 
.28  .39  .41  .61  .98  .20  .22  .26  .28 
1.69  2.38  3.11  3.51  3.85  1.61  1.69  1.16  1.11 
4.18  8.21  13.31  18.79  22.53  4.15  5.44  2.46  2.21 
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP) 
Mean (M) 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Median (MD) 
Interquartile range (IQR) 
Skewness (SK) 
Kurtosis (KU) 
.64  I .09  1.56  2.00  2.47  .78  .85  .93  .96 
.23  .37  .51  .63  .84  .20  .20  .24  .26 
.59  I .00  1.41  1.82  2.26  .76  .82  .92  .94 
.22  .33  .46  .63  .89  .29  .29  .34  .33 
1.59  1.77  1.82  I .76  1.92  1.09  .70  .30  .33 
2.89  4.12  4.12  4.13  6.12  2.20  .87  -.18  .36 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) 
Mean (M) 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Median (MD) 
Interquartile range (IQR) 
Skewness (SK) 
Kurtosis (KU) 
.42  .I7  1.16  1.63  2.14  .50  .56  .61  .65 
.I3  .23  .35  .45  .59  .I2  .13  .16  .18 
.38  .72  1.08  1.55  2.07  .49  .54  .57  .62 
.I4  .23  .47  .51  .69  .I5  .I8  .16  .19 
1.84  1.29  1.11  .71  .64  .85  1.17  1.11  .98 
4.53  2.51  2.21  .85  .84  1.36  1.25  2.20  1.76 
Note: See table 1.6, Table 1.8  Distribution of Root Mean Square Errors in Individual Forecasts of  Nominal and Real GNP Growth and Inflation, 1%8-90 
Row  Statistic 
Average Errors by Span (Qs)  Marginal Errors by Span (Qs) 
0-1  0-2  0-3  0-4  0-5  1-2  2-3  3-4  4-5 



















Gross National Product (GNP) 
Mean (M) 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Median (MD) 
Interquartile range (IQR) 
Skewness (SK) 
Kurtosis (KU) 
.81  1.45  2.07  2.58  3.20  I .02  1.12  1.13  1.19 
.30  .55  .76  .92  1.25  .3 I  .30  .30  .38 
.74  I .33  1.93  2.45  3.06  .97  1.10  1.11  1.14 
.38  .47  .61  .69  1.14  .25  .29  .39  .40 
1.20  2.17  2.36  2.34  2.43  1.63  1.34  .55  1.51 
1.52  6.48  7.32  9.47  10.59  3.97  3.65  .06  4.61 
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP) 
Mean (M) 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Median (MD) 
Interquartile range (IQR) 
Skewness (SK) 
Kultosis (KU) 
.85  1.44  2.08  2.74  3.38  I .05  1.16  1.27  1.32 
.35  .49  .67  .82  1.04  .31  .28  .33  .38 
.77  1.32  I .90  2.51  3.12  .98  1.15  1.26  1.31 
.34  .54  .80  .83  1.18  .38  .39  SO  .51 
1.78  1.54  1.54  1.30  1.22  1.37  .47  .I8  .46 
4.02  3.42  3.29  2.04  I .90  3.08  .20  -.I1  .86 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) 
Mean (M) 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Median (MD) 
Interquartile range (IQR) 
Skewness (SK) 
Kurtosis (KU) 
.54  .99  1 SO  2.10  2.79  .65  .72  .I9  .85 
.I9  .32  .43  .57  .I5  .20  .I8  .24  .25 
.47  .91  1.43  2.06  2.79  .61  .70  .74  .81 
.I8  .30  .55  .79  I .08  .22  .24  .22  .33 
1.82  1.44  .89  .54  .I8  1.44  .94  1.51  1.21 
3.35  2.78  1.15  1.06  -  .04  3.00  1.58  4. I9  3.64 
Nore: See table 1.6. 36  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
Averaging  all predictions in each survey for a given variable and horizon 
results in a time series of group mean (or median) forecasts. These are often 
called “consensus” forecasts,  whether or not there is much actual consensus 
among  the  respondents.  The group  mean  predictions  based  on  our  GNP, 
RGNP,  and IPD sample forecasts have considerably smaller errors than the 
average individual respondent,  as shown by comparisons of the ME, MEA, 
and RMSE entries in table 1.9 (cf. cols. 1 and 4, 2 and 5, and 3 and 6). The 
absolute or squared errors tend to increase with the span of forecast for both 
individuals and group means, but less so for the latter. 
For each individual time series of forecasts,  a series of  group mean fore- 
casts has been computed with strictly matching coverage in terms of the sur- 
vey dates and target characteristics. Table 1.10 shows the locational statistics 
for the distributions of the ratios of the individual RMSEs to the correspond- 
ing group RMSEs.  These measures  indicate that the group mean forecasts 
were more accurate than about 75 percent of  the sampled respondents’ fore- 
casts. Thus, most of the first- or lower-quartile (Q,)  ratios are close to one (but 
some for RGNP are lower), most of the median (Q,)  ratios are 1.1-1.2,  and 
most of the third- or upper-quartile (Q,)  ratios are 1.3-1.5  (cf. rows 2-4,  7- 
9, and 12-14).  These distributions are bounded from below (any ratio greater 
than zero) and are heavily  skewed to the right (e.g., the entries for the best 
forecasts in table 1.10 are 0.5-0.9,  those for the worst 3-7). 
Unlike their numerators and denominators,  the ratios of  the individual  to 
the group RMSEs do not depend systematically on the length of the forecast 
or distance to the target quarter. Also, the diversity of the individual forecasts 
by source, variable, and horizon is greatly reduced by the normalization with 
the group means. Thus, the ratios for the same quartiles are not very different 
for GNP, RGNP, and IPD. 
1.3.4  Some Overall Accuracy and Variability Measures 
The preceding tables offer some insight into the structure of errors calcu- 
lated from the survey forecasts,  but not into their relative levels. The latter 
will be assessed by comparisons with benchmark predictions from time-series 
models selected to fit the characteristics of the variables concerned and with 
forecasts from other sources. But, first, we take a quick look at the average 
values of the outcomes for the target series so as to gain some idea about the 
orders of magnitude invoived. 
Columns 7-9  in table  1.9 show, successively, the means, standard devia- 
tions, and root mean square values (RMSVs) of the actual percentage changes 
in the targeted variables. The absolute values of the average errors in the in- 
dividual forecasts and, a fortiori, in the group mean forecasts are generally 
very small compared with the average actual changes,  particularly for GNP 
and IPD (cf. cols.  1 and 7). The average RMSEs of the individual forecasts 
are about 30-37  percent of the RMSVs for the nominal GNP growth and infla- 
tion and 68-72  percent of  the RMSVs for the real GNP growth rates (cf. cols. Table 1.9  Individual and Group Mean Forecasts and Actual Values of Nominal and Real GNP Growth and Inflation: Selected Statistics  on 
Accuracy and Variability, 1968-90 
Individual Forecasts’  Group Mean Forecastsb  Actual Values (%AY 
M  MAE  RMSE  M  MAE  RMSE  M  SD  RMSV 
Row  Span (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Gross National Product (GNP) 
1  0-1  -  .09  .62  .81  -  .08  .49  .64  1.98  .96  2.20 
2  0-2  -.I1  1.12  1.45  -.lo  .84  1.11  4.00  I .OO  4.31 
3  0-3  -.11  1.60  2.07  -  .07  1.22  1.61  6.07  2.14  6.44 
4  04  -.14  1.99  2.58  -  .02  1.56  2.06  8.20  2.63  8.61 
5  0-5  -  .30  2.48  3.20  -  .09  1.91  2.51  10.38  3.12  10.84 
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP) 
6  0-1  -  .01  .64  .85  -  .02  SO  .64  .61  1.03  1.20 
7  0-2  .09  1.09  1.44  .02  .83  1.11  1.23  1.77  2.16 
8  0-3  .25  1.56  2.08  .16  1.17  1.61  1.86  2.40  3.04 
9  04  .45  2.00  2.74  .33  1.42  2.05  2.50  2.95  3.87 
10  0-5  .48  2.47  3.38  .40  1.70  2.47  3.15  3.45  4.67 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) 
11  0-1  -  .07  .42  .54  -  .04  .28  .35  1.36  .65  1.51 
12  0-2  -.19  .71  .99  -.12  .55  .70  2.74  I .25  3.01 
13  0-3  -  .36  1.16  1  SO  -  .22  .84  1.13  4.16  1.84  4.55 
14  04  -  .57  1.63  2.10  -  .34  1.21  1.64  5.60  2.43  6.10 
15  G5  -  .65  2.14  2.79  -  .37  1.63  2.23  7.08  3.03  7.70 
Note: On the symbols used, see previous tables and the text. 
*Means of  the corresponding statistics for individual forecasts (as shown in tables 1.6-1.8,  rows 1, 7, and 13, cols.  1-5). 
bSurvey-by-survey  “consensus” forecasts based on the sampled data, as explained in the text. 
‘45-day estimates, as used in tables 1  .&I  .8. RMSV  = root mean square value computed as V[(ME)’  + (SD)*]. Table 1.10  Individual-to-Group  Mean Ratios of Root Mean Square Errors: Selected Distributional Statistics for Forecasts of Nominal 
and Real GNP Growth and Inflation, 1968-90 













First quartile (QJ 
Median (MD) 





First quartile (Q,) 
Median (MD) 





First quartile (QI) 
Median (MD) 




Average Errors by Span (Qs)  Marginal Errors by Span (Qs) 
0-1  0-2  0-3  0-4  0-5  1-2  2-3  3-4  4-5 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Gross National Product (GNP) 
.84  .72  .88  .79  .78  .85  .85  .82  .68 
1.10  1.07  I .07  1.08  1.03  1.05  1.07  1.06  1.07 
1.22  1.23  1.19  1.20  1.18  1.15  1.11  1.13  1.14 
1.62  1.46  1.38  1.36  I .43  1.33  1.25  1.28  1.32 
7.34  5.35  5.90  5.78  5.57  3.12  2.88  2.56  4.26 
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP) 
.82  .63  .77  .82  .82  .76  .87  .86  .83 
1.11  1.09  1.04  1.06  1.06  1.06  1.06  I .04  1.03 
1.30  I .20  1.17  1.14  1.14  1.17  1.14  1.13  1.11 
1.58  1.40  1.36  1.38  1.33  1.31  1.30  1.28  1.31 
4.84  3.87  6.45  5.76  6.69  3.29  3.77  4.40  3.84 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) 
.83  .88  .82  .55  .53  .67  .88  .81  .7  I 
1.13  1.03  1.02  .99  1  .oo  I .03  I .02  1.02  1.02 
1.24  1.21  1.15  1.12  1.12  1.17  1.12  1.11  1.11 
1.56  1.39  1.34  1.27  1.23  I .39  I .32  1.23  I .29 
3.55  4.30  3.55  3.74  3.37  3.27  2.68  2.86  3.71 
- 
Note:  All entries show ratios RMSEJRMSE,, where the subscripts  i and g refer to the individual and group mean forecasts, respectively. MIN and MAX denote the lowest 
and highest ratios in each distribution, QI  and Q, denote the lower- and upper-quartile ratios, and MD denotes the median ratio. 39  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
3 and 9). The RMSEs of the group mean forecasts are about 23-29  percent of 
the RMSVs for nominal GNP growth and inflation and 51-53  percent of the 
RMSVs for real GNP growth (cf. cols. 6 and 9). 
1.3.5 
Each forecaster in our sample of  11  1 was ranked by the accuracy of his or 
her predictions,  separately for each forecast target as defined by the date of 
the survey (t),  variable, and span (e.g., for the GNP 0-1  predictions made in 
1970:I). Let r,, be the rank of the ith respondent in the time t survey, which 
increases from the smallest to the largest squared error. The number of surveys 
covered per respondent (m,)  varied widely across individuals, and the number 
of respondents  per survey (n,)  varied widely across time (see table  1.2, col. 
6).  In view of this variability, it was necessary to normalize the ranks by the 
number  of participants in the particular  survey. This is done by calculating 
R, = 100rJn,.  The best forecast in each set would have rrr  = 1, and hence 
R,, = 100/n,. The worst forecast would have rlt = n,,  and hence R,, = 100. 
This setup permits us to consider the question, How stable were the accuracy 
rankings of  the forecasters over time? 
When the ranks are aggregated across the corresponding sets for each indi- 
vidual, measures of central tendency and dispersion are obtained that charac- 
terize the distributions over time of the ranks. Thus, for a given variable and 
span, the overall rank of the ith forecaster is R, = l/m CF  R,,, and the corre- 
sponding standard deviation equals [ l/m Z:  (R,, -  R,)2]1’2.  We compute such 
means, standard deviations, medians, quartiles, and ranges for each of the 11  1 
individuals  covered. Table  1.11 presents  simple averages of  some of  these 
measures in columns 1-4.  For example, the grand means (Ms) in column 1 
represent l?  = 1/111 C, R,. 
In addition, columns 5-10  of table 1.11 summarize the distributions across 
individuals of the mean normalized ranks R,. The selected statistics include 
SD, quartiles, and extremes. For example, here SD = [1/111 C, (R, -  R)2]1/2 
(col. 5). 
The entries in column 1 are all very close: 53-55  for GNP, 52 for RGNP, 
and 54-59  for IPD. The corresponding medians  (not shown) are similarly 
clustered  but  one to two points larger.  In fact, there is very  little variation 
between the entries in any column of table 1.1  1. That is, the distributions of 
the normalized  ranks are very similar for any of  the three variables covered 
and for any of the five spans. 
Typically, any forecaster would rank high at some times and low at others. 
Indeed, the average range of 85-90  (col. 4) is close to the maximum range 
possible  for the R,, ranks (which cannot exceed 99  and would not be much 
larger than 90 for relatively small values of n,). The forecaster’s rank would 
fall in the center half of  the distribution (i.e., in the interquartile range IQR) 
nearly 50 percent of the time and within k SD of the mean perhaps up to 66 
percent of the time (cols. 2 and 3). There is no evidence of a high skewness or 
Have Any Forecasters Excelled Consistently? Table 1.11  Ranking Forecasters According to Their Accuracy in Predicting Nominal and Real GNP and Inflation Rates: Selected 
Measures, 1968-90 
Distribution over Time of  Individual 
Normalized Ranks (R,,):  Means of: 
Distribution across Individuals of Mean 
Normalized Ranks (R,) 
Span  M  SD  IQR  Range  SD  MIN  Q,  MD  Q3  MAX 
Row  (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Gross National Product (GNP) 
1  &1  53  21  46  87  10  38  48  53  59  95 
2  0-2  53  21  46  87  11  32  45  51  59  98 
3  0-3  53  21  46  88  11  36  46  51  58  100 
4  w  53  21  46  86  11  33  47  52  58  99 
5  &5  53  26  45  85  12  30  46  51  58  100 
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP) 
6  &I  52  28  50  90  9  29  41  52  56  11 
1  0-2  52  28  41  89  10  30  41  51  51  94 
8  63  52  28  47  88  9  35  46  51  51  89 
9  &4  52  28  48  88  9  34  45  51  58  81 
10  0-5  52  28  48  86  10  31  45  51  57  99 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) 
11  0-1  59  28  48  89  10  40  52  57  65  93 
12  0-2  56  28  48  89  10  39  49  56  62  95 
13  0-3  55  28  47  88  10  33  48  54  60  98 
14  0-4  54  28  46  88  10  29  48  54  60  93 
15  0-5  54  21  46  86  11  29  45  54  59  94 
Note: The basic unit of  measurement is the normalized rank R,, = IWrJn,), where r,, = rank of the ith forecaster in the time I  set of predictions for a given variable and 
span, and n, = number of forecasters in the same set. The ranks are assigned according to the squared errors (P  -  A)*, from the smallest to the largest. The entries in 
cols. 1-4  represent the means of  the summary measures for the distributions  of  the individuals’ ranks over time (e.g., M in col.  1 refers to R  = lln C:  R,, where R,  = 
l/m 2: R,,; similarly for the standard deviations in  col. 2, etc.). The entries in cols. 5-10  characterize the distributions across the individuals of  R,. All statistics are 
rounded off, with no decimals shown. For symbols, see the preceding tables and the text. 41  Twenty-two Years of  NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
a high kurtosis in these distributions. To  sum up, the forecasting performance 
of any one individual relative to another is likely to be highly variable over 
time. 
On the other hand, the dispersion of  the corresponding forecasts and their 
errors across individuals will tend to be limited by  the commonality of  the 
targets of  the forecasters and of  the information and methods available to 
them. The correlations between the forecasters’ errors are expected to be pos- 
itive and may be high. Our measures presumably reflect all these regularities. 
Interestingly, the standard deviations in column 2 are 26-28,  but those in col- 
umn 5 are only 9-12  (note that the definition of  the former includes time t 
explicitly, while the definition of the latter does not). Similarly, the IQRs in 
column 3 are 45-50,  those implied by  columns 7 and 9 are 9-15,  and the 
corresponding total ranges are 85-90  and 30-59  (cf. cols. 4 and 6-10).  These 
numbers seem consistent with the results obtained in some previous studies 
indicating that fluctuations over time contribute more than differences across 
forecasters to the overall variation in  forecast errors (see Zarnowitz  1974, 
For each of  the forecast targets identified in  lines 1-15  of  table  1.11, the 
ranks according to R, form a relatively tight cluster between the values of  Q, 
and Q,  that average 47 and 59, respectively (cols. 7-9).  One-quarter of the 
group performed poorly relative to the others, with Ri  values ranging from 
well above 60 to 100 (cols. 9-10).  However, our attention centers on the top- 
ranking quarter, with Ri  values averaging in the 30s and 40s (cols. 6-7).  The 
latter can be said to have excelled with respect to the given category of fore- 
cast targets. 
All these subsets, of course, consist of  individuals who are coded and can 
be identified. It is important to ask next what the correlations of the ranks are 
between the different variables and spans. For example, do those who best 
predicted the growth of real GNP also tend to excel in predicting inflation? Do 
those who rank high in forecasting over the shortest horizons also rank high 
in forecasting over the longer horizons? 
Table 1.12 indicates that the answers to these questions are on the whole 
positive. The correlations among our normalized ranks, both across the vari- 
ables for each span (rows 1-3)  and across the spans for each variable (rows 
4-13),  are all positive and sufficiently high not to be due to chance. Forecast- 
ers who predict relatively well (poorly) any one of these targets are also likely 
to predict well (poorly) any of the other targets. Not surprisingly, the correla- 
tions are higher the more closely related the forecast targets are. Thus, they 
are higher for GNP and RGNP than for RGNP and IPD and higher for suc- 
cessive spans (e.g.,  0-1  and  0-2)  than for more  distant spans (e.g.,  0-1 
and 0-5).  Similar results have been  found for other variables and periods 
and for marginal as well as average change forecasts (cf. Zarnowitz  1984, 
578-79). 
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Table 1.12  Respondents to NBER-ASA Surveys Ranked According to the 
Accuracy of Their Forecasts of Nominal and Real GNP Growth and 
IPD Inflation Rates: Correlations among the Ranks and across 
Variables and Horizons, 1968-90 
Correlated for Forecast Horizons (in Qs) 
0-1  0-2  0-3  0-4  0-5 







.73  .74  .68  .64  .64 
.56  .64  .68  .59  .59 
.47  .52  .54  .5  I  .42 
Correlated for Variables 
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Nore: The correlations are based on the normalized ranks described in the text and table  1.1  1. 
On the symbols used, see previous tables and the text. 
1.3.6  Comparisons with Bayesian Vector Autoregressive (BVAR) 
Forecasts 
We  use a BVAR model with five variables: RGNP, IPD, M2 (broad money 
supply), LI (the composite index of leading indicators), and TBR (the three- 
month Treasury-bill rate). TBR is a level series; the others are series of growth 
rates. The model is estimated on quarterly series, each taken  with six lags. 
The data are those presently  available  (i.e., they  incorporate all revisions), 
and, in this sense, the forecasts based on them are ex post. But the forecasts 
are generated sequentially,  using only the information preceding  the date of 
the forecast. 
Unlike the  forecasters,  who can take advantage of  the  early information 
provided  by the monthly and weekly  time series released during the survey 
quarter, the BVAR model does not draw on any such data. On the other hand, 
unlike the BVAR model, which is based  on the present,  revised  series, the 
forecasters  work  under the disadvantage of  having  access only to the latest 
preliminary data, that is, data containing measurement errors that have yet to 
be eliminated by revisions. 43  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
Because the quarterly data for the survey quarter (1) are not known to the 
forecasters,  our first approach was to impute the same lack of knowledge to 
our BVAR model.  Here, then, the shortest prediction  is for 0-1,  the longest 
for 0-5.  But, as pointed out by Christopher Sims during the conference, this 
approach (now called “variant A’) ignores any effects on the survey forecasts 
of the most recent economic news. Since the knowledge of the news on bal- 
ance presumably helps the forecasters, variant A in this respect handicaps our 
BVAR, as it would more generally any model based strictly on quarterly time 
series only. 
For this reason, we also present the results of alternative calculations (“var- 
iant B”), which assume full knowledge of the actual values in quarter  1, or 
effectively perfect foresight.  Here, for 0-1,  the error of the BVAR model is 
identically zero, and no comparisons with the survey forecasts are available; 
the shortest prediction is for 1-2.  Thus, the two variants represent contrasting 
extremes: in A there is no knowledge; in B there is full knowledge of period  1 
values. Variant B handicaps the real-life forecaster, who has only partial and 
indirect knowledge of the target variable in the current (survey) quarter. 
It follows that the truth about the relative accuracy of the individual fore- 
casts from the surveys and the BVAR forecasts falls somewhere between var- 
iants A and B. Table 1.13 provides the evidence, showing in columns 1-3  that 
the measures of error of BVAR variant A for spans 0-1,  0-2,  . . . ,  etc. are 
approximately equal to the corresponding measures of error of BVAR variant 
B for spans 0-2,  0-3,  . . . ,  etc., respectively (cf. rows 1 and 7, 2 and 8, and 
so on). As would be expected, the RMSE ratios in columns 4-8  are through- 
out lower for variant A than for variant B, when comparing entries for the 
corresponding  spans (rows 2 and 7, 3 and 8, and so on). That is, variant B 
calculations show the BVAR model forecasts in a relatively  more favorable 
light than variant A calculations do. 
We present the results for both variants of the retroactively used time-series 
models for comparisons  relating to GNP, RGNP, and IPD (this covers both 
our own and outside, multivariate and univariate models). For the other vari- 
ables, only variant A is used.  More often than not, the “true” outcomes are 
probably closer to the variant A than to the variant B comparisons because the 
forecasters’ information about recent and current developments is in fact quite 
limited and deficient and because the forecasters use preliminary data and the 
time-series models use revised data. When all is considered, it can be argued 
that variant  B handicaps  the forecasters more than  variant A handicaps the 
models. 
The RMSE ratios in table 1.13, columns 4-8,  indicate that at least 75 per- 
cent of the individual forecasts of GNP, 50 percent  of  those of IPD, and 25 
percent of those of RGNP were more accurate than the variant A BVAR fore- 
casts. Thus, the Q, ratios are less than  1.0 for nominal growth and close to 
1  .O for inflation, For real growth, the MD ratios approach unity at spans of 2 
to 3 quarters and exceed it at longer spans. The ratios based on the variant B Table 1.13  BVAR Forecasts (’Ifvo Variants) versus Individual Forecasts from NBER-ASA Surveys: Summary 
Measures of Error and RMSE Ratios for GNP, RGNP, and IPD, 1968-90 
BVAR Forecasts’  RMSE Ratios, Individual to BVAR Forecastsb 
1  0-1 
2  0-2 
3  0-3 
4  0-4 
5  0-5 
6  0-1 
7  0-2 
8  0-3 
9  M 
10  0-5 
11  0-1 
12  0-2 
13  0-3 
14  0-4 
15  0-5 
Gross National Product (GNP): Variant A 
.07  .84  1.11  .32  .54  .66  .91  1.89 
.18  1.47  1.92  .34  .57  .68  .83  2.00 
.26  2.08  2.73  .38  .58  .70  .83  2.44 
.33  2.59  3.45  .24  .59  .68  .85  2.61 
.38  3.23  4.23  .25  .54  .67  .82  2.41 
GNP  Variant B 
0  0  0  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
.07  .87  1.14  .43  .75  .85  1.03  2.89 
.I7  1.49  1.96  .53  .78  .91  1.03  1.90 
.26  2.12  2.80  .49  .81  .91  1.05  1.82 
.33  2.63  3.53  .63  .86  .96  1.13  2.29 
GNP in Constant Dollars (RGNP): Variant A 
.08  .78  I .oo  .29  .59  .75  .99  3.65 
.20  1.09  1.51  .36  .73  .89  1.07  2.25 
.28  1.53  2.03  .43  .79  .93  1.13  2.36 
.35  1.76  2.34  .52  .96  1.08  1.29  2.74 
.39  2.05  2.64  .41  1 .oo  1.13  1.40  2.90 RGNP: Variant B 
~~  ~ 
16  0-1  0  0  0  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
17  0-2  .09  .78  1.01  .48  .83  .96  1.16  3.87 
18  0-3  .20  1.11  1.53  .46  1 .oo  1.15  1.33  2.85 
19  04  .29  1.56  2.06  .63  I .06  1.19  1.37  3.68 
20  0-5  .36  1.79  2.38  .71  1.18  1.40  1.61  3.14 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD): Variant A 
21  0-1  .05  .37  .48  .55  .81  .97  1.16  3.68 
22  0-2  .ll  .76  t97  .49  .76  .87  1.02  3.62 
23  0-3  .17  1.18  1.53  .40  .72  .86  1.02  2.95 
24  0-4  .23  1.65  2.18  .38  .72  .87  1.04  2.74 
25  0-5  .28  2.19  2.94  .37  .I2  .86  1.06  3.94 
IPD: Variant B 
26  0-1  0  0  0  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
27  0-2  .04  .37  .47  .70  1.07  1.23  1.51  3.69 
28  0-3  .I0  .76  .97  .71  .95  1.09  1.30  2.83 
29  04  .I6  1.17  1.53  .57  .98  1.10  1.24  2.56 
30  0-5  .21  1.64  2.18  .61  .95  1.08  1.24  4.23 
Note: N.A.  = not available. 
'Based  on a model with five variables (RGNP, IPD, M2, LI, and TBR) and six quarterly lags, estimated sequentially with presently 
available data. Variant A assumes that the last known values of the variables to be predicted refer to the quarter t - 1 (denoted 0); 
variant B assumes that they refer to the current quarter t (denoted 1). 
bRMSE,/RMSE,,,, where the subscript i refers to the individual forecasts from the NBER-ASA surveys and the subscript bv  refers to 
the corresponding Bayesian vector autoregressive (BVAR) forecasts (variant A in  rows  1-5,  11-15,  and 21-25;  variant B in rows 
6-10,  16-20,  and 26-30).  MIN and MAX denote the lowest and highest ratios in each distribution, Q, and Q, denote the lower- and 
upper-quartile ratios, and MD denotes the median ratio. 46  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
BVAR forecasts still show most of the survey forecasts to be superior for GNP, 
but not for IPD or RGNP. Here the ratios rise above 1  .O for all horizons at Q, 
for GNP, at MD for IPD, and even at Q, for RGNP. 
The BVAR mean errors are all positive, unlike the MEs for the NBER-ASA 
survey forecasts,  which are mostly negative for GNP and IPD and mostly 
positive but somewhat mixed for RGNP.  (For this and the rest of  the para- 
graph, see table  1.13, cols.  1-3,  and table  1.9, cols.  1-6.)  Comparisons of 
the MAEs and RMSEs of  BVAR  with the corresponding measures for the 
average individual survey forecast produce a mixed picture, depending on the 
series and criteria used. However, the comparisons with the group means are 
generally adverse for BVAR of either variant. 
Such variables as the leading index and the short-term interest rate act as 
strong codeterminants of  growth in total output, as suggested by regression 
estimates and out-of-sample predictions with  VAR  models (Zarnowitz and 
Braun 1990; Zarnowitz 1992, chap. 11). Our findings here are consistent with 
these results. The BVAR forecasts of  RGNP perform relatively well, which 
holds a potentially useful lesson for the forecasters to take proper account of 
these relations.  But  the  BVAR  forecasts of  GNP and IPD  are  apparently 
weaker. 
1.3.7  Comparing Forecasts for the First and Second Halves of  1968-90 
The period 1968:1V-1979:111 was one of upward drifts and large instability 
in both inflation and unemployment; of business contractions in 1969-70  and 
1973-75; of the Vietnam War and price control disturbances in the early years; 
and of  severe supply (mainly oil price) shocks in the middle and late years. 
The period 1979:1V-1990:1 was one of more successful attempts to slow infla- 
tion by  restrictive monetary policy; of  sharp rises in prices and interest rates 
followed by downward trends in the wake of two back-to-back recessions in 
1980 and  1981-82;  of  a long expansion that followed, interrupted by  slow- 
downs in 1984-86 and 1989; and of new trade and financial problems. It is of 
interest to ask how the macro forecasts fared in these two so different periods 
of approximately equal length. 
The errors of the individual forecasts from the NBER-ASA surveys were 
on average larger in 1979-90  than in  1968-79  for GNP but smaller for IPD, 
judging from the comparisons of the RMSEs in table 1.14, columns 1 and 5. 
For RGNP, the differences between the two subperiods are small and mixed, 
depending on the horizon of the forecasts. 
The average individual (i)-to-group mean (g) RMSE ratios differ little be- 
tween  1968-79  (1.04 5 i/g ? 1.34)  and  1979-90  (1.15 5 i/g 2 1.31). 
They decreased somewhat in the latter period for short GNP and RGNP fore- 
casts, increased more for longer IPD forecasts, but remained approximately 
unchanged in most cases (cf. cols. 2 and 6). 
The individual-to-BVAR (bv) RMSE ratios for GNP rose from 0.6 or less 
in 1968-79  to around 0.8 in 1979-90; those for RGNP rose as well, from an Table 1.14  Individual, Group Mean, and BVAR Forecasts of Percentage Changes in GNP, RGNP, and IPD: 
Selected Comparisons by Span and Subperiods, 1968-79 and 1979-90 
Forecasts for 1968:1V-1979:111  Forecasts for 1979:IV-I990:1 
RMSE Ratios  RMSE Ratiosh 
Median  Median 
Span  RMSE,"  i/g  i/bv  glbv  RMSE,"  i/g  i/bv  g/bv 
Rows  (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Gross National Product (GNP) 
1  0-1  .60  1.34  .53  .48  .86  1.15  .79  .71 
2  a-2  1.13  1.20  .58  .50  1.56  1.17  .78  .69 
3  a-3  1.68  1.18  .60  .5 1  2.23  1.18  .81  .70 
4  0-4  2.04  1.21  .60  .49  3.08  1.15  .81  .7  1 
5  a-5  2.24  1.19  .51  .47  3.80  1.18  .82  .70 
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP) 
6  0-1  .69  I .29  .62  .57  .80  1.20  .88  .76 
7  a-2  1.25  1.18  .78  .69  1.34  1.15  1.01  .82 
8  0-3  1.87  1.17  .85  .76  I .80  1.15  1.03  .86 
9  04  2.59  1.14  .99  .84  2.30  1.16  1.16  .94 
10  c5  3.13  1.13  1.04  .92  2.84  1.15  1.24  .99 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) 
11  0-1  .50  1.29  .90  .73  .37  I .22  .87  .74 
12  0-2  1  .oo  1.14  .90  .80  .64  1.31  .70  .56 
13  0-3  1.57  1.08  .89  .84  .93  1.28  .60  .5 I 
14  c-4  2.25  1.04  .92  .89  1.37  1.26  .64  .50 
15  a-5  3.06  1.05  .99  .95  1.94  1.25  .63  .49 
aMedian  of the root mean square errors of the individual forecasts from the quarterly NBER-ASA surveys. 
hRatio of  the median RMSE of the individual forecasts (i) to the RMSE of the corresponding group mean forecast (9) in cols. 2  and 
6.  Ratio of  the median RMSE of the individual forecasts (i) to the RMSE of the corresponding BVAR model forecast (bv) in cols. 3 
and 7.  Ratio of the RMSE of the group mean forecast (g) to the RMSE of the corresponding BVAR model (bv) in cols. 4  and 8. 48  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
approximate range of  0.6-1.0  to 0.9-1.2;  and those for IPD declined from 
0.9-1.0  to 0.6-0.9  (cols. 3 and 7). These i/bv ratios, then, show that, on 
average, the NBER-ASA survey forecasts outperformed our BVAR forecasts, 
except for RGNP in 1979-90.  The group mean predictions from the surveys 
were throughout more accurate than BVAR; that is, the ratios g/bv are less 
than one in all cases (cols. 4 and 8). As might be expected, the changes in 
i/bv and g/bv between the two subperiods paralleled each other directionally. 
There is no evidence here that, on the whole, the forecasts either improved 
or deteriorated in the 1980s as compared with the 1970s. The BVAR bench- 
mark proved a little more effective in 1979-90  than in  1968-79  for nominal 
and real GNP growth and somewhat less effective for inflation. 
1.4  Other Forecasts for 1968-90 
1.4.1  Percentage Change Forecasts: Industrial Production and 
Corporate Profits 
Table 1.15 shows that the average errors of  the forecasts of  IP (industrial 
production) and CP (corporate profits) tended to be positive but widely dis- 
persed  and  strongly increasing with the span (cols.  1-3).  The RMSEs  in- 
creased in a similar fashion (cols. 4-6).  Comparisons with the average size 
and variability of the actual changes (cols. 9-1  1) indicate a moderate level of 
accuracy for the IP forecasts but poor overall performance for the CP forecasts 
(where the mean and median RMSEs exceed the actual SD and RMSV val- 
ues). The large positive values of SK and KU for the IP predictions up to three 
quarters ahead suggest skewness to the right and fat tails; the latter may also 
characterize the longer CP predictions (cols. 7-8). 
Combining the individual forecasts by  simple averaging reduces the errors 
substantially for IP (except for the longest span) but not for CP,  where the 
gains from using the group mean or consensus forecast are small (cf. table 
1.15, cols. 4 and 6, with table  1.16, col.  1). Accordingly, the RMSE ratios 
i/g are smaller for CP than for IP, but it is still true for both variables that only 
about the best 25 percent of  the sample are more accurate than the group mean 
forecasts (see table 1.16, cols. 2-4). 
The BVAR model forecasts (variant A only) outperform the group mean 
forecasts for profits. The comparisons for the production index yield closer 
and mixed results, which favor the survey group’s predictions for the shorter 
and the BVAR predictions for the longer horizons. (Compare the correspond- 
ing entries in cols. 1-4  and 5-8  of table 1.16.) 
In almost all cases, both IP and CP forecasts had larger RMSEs in 1979-90 
than in 1968-79  (table 1.17, cols. 1 and 5). Compared with BVAR variant A, 
the survey forecasts look better in the earlier than in the later subperiod, par- 
ticularly for IP (cf. cols. 3 and 4 with cols. 7 and 8, respectively). Table 1.15  Selected Measures of Forecast Accuracy and Actual Values: Percentage Changes in Industrial Production and 
Corporate Profits, by Span, 1968-90 
Mean Error  Root Mean Square Error  Actual Valued 
Span  M  SD  MD  M  SD  MD  SK  KU  M  SD  RMSV 
Row  (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
~ 
Index of Industrial Production (IP)b 
1  0-1  .04  .58  .02  1.66  1.08  1.54  7.89  73.16  .76  2.17  2.29 
2  0-2  .83  1.07  .30  3.13  1.80  2.93  7.66  69.68  1.52  3.79  4.08 
3  0-3  .67  1.58  .63  4.52  2.10  4.26  6.28  52.71  2.28  5.04  5.53 
4  0-4  1.04  1.90  1.09  5.45  1.35  5.34  .80  1.58  3.06  6.08  6.81 
5  0-5  1.06  2.27  1.35  6.19  1.37  6.02  .36  1.05  3.83  6.95  7.94 
Corporate Profits after Taxes (CP)' 
6  0-1  .26  2.49  -.02  9.50  2.03  9.39  .04  1.08  1.33  7.36  7.48 
7  0-2  1.00  4.58  .76  14.42  2.86  14.71  -.39  1.95  2.78  11.13  11.47 
8  0-3  2.58  6.54  2.64  18.58  3.32  18.75  -.14  4.23  4.17  13.54  14.17 
9  0-4  4.11  8.20  4.39  22.38  4.29  22.58  .05  7.34  5.55  15.56  16.52 
10  0-5  6.29  9.66  6.41  26.30  4.94  26.47  .93  9.07  7.01  17.82  19.15 
"Refers to the period 1970:1-1989:IV. 
bBased  on the second revision of the monthly data. 
'Based on the first July revision of the quarterly data. 50  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
Table 1.16  Individual, Group Mean, and BVAR Forecasts of Percentage Changes in 
Industrial Production and Corporate Profits: Selected Comparisons, by 
Span, 1968-90 
RMSE RatiosJbv  Group  RMSE Ratios i/g 
Mean  BVAR” 
MD  Q,  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q,  Span  RMSE  Q, 
(6)  (7)  (8)  (5)  (2)  (3)  (4)  Row  (Qs)  (1) 
Index of Industrial Production (IP)b 
1  0-1  1.17  1.13  1.26  1.54  1.56  .85  1.00  1.32 
2  0-2  2.44  1.06  1.16  1.30  2.83  .90  1.04  1.45 
3  0-3  3.50  1.07  1.16  1.28  3.66  .99  1.20  1.58 
4  M  4.55  1.06  1.13  1.24  4.25  1.04  1.25  1.74 
5  0-5  6.16  1.05  1.13  1.26  4.78  1.04  1.21  1.66 
Corporate Profits after Taxes (CIP)’ 
6  0-1  9.24  1~00  1.08  1.14  7.22  1.25  1.41  1.58 
7  0-2  13.68  1.01  1.08  1.16  11.22  1.15  1.32  1.49 
8  0-3  17.36  1.00  1.06  1.14  14.35  1.14  1.29  1.44 
9  CL4  20.98  1.00  1.06  1.14  16.62  1.18  1.31  1.48 
10  0-5  24.41  .98  1.05  1.12  19.16  1.14  1.33  1.51 
aFor  IP, based on a model with six variables (RGNP, IPD, M2, LI, TBR, and IP) and six quarterly lags, 
estimated sequentially with presently available data. For CP, based on a model with six variables (RGNP, 
IPD, M2, LI, TBR, and CP) and six quarterly lags, estimated sequentially with presently available data. 
BVAR variant A is used throughout. 
hBased on the second revision of the monthly data. 
‘Based on the first July revision of  the quarterly data. 
1.4.2  Level Forecasts: Unemployment Rate and Housing Starts 
For UR  (unemployment  rate; table  1.18, rows  1-5),  the mean errors are 
predominantly negative, suggesting some underprediction, but they also show 
considerable dispersion.  Level errors, unlike average change errors, do not 
cumulate, but the RMSEs still increase substantially with the distance to the 
target quarter.  The summary error measures  are quite small  relative  to the 
statistics for the actual values of UR. For short forecasts, the distributions of 
the RMSEs are skewed to the right and have fat tails, judging from the large 
SK and KU values. 
For HS (housing starts; rows 6-10),  the mean errors are close to zero and 
have mixed signs. They do not depend on the distance to the target (unlike the 
mean errors for UR, which increase with the distance). The RMSE and SD 
values, as usual, increase for the longer forecasts, but they remain fairly small 
compared  with the measures  for the actual values of  HS. The SK and KU 
figures are small. 
Combining the individual forecasts results in substantial gains in accuracy 
for both variables, but particularly for UR  (cf. table  1.19, col.  1, and table 51  Twenty-two Years of  NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
Table 1.17  Individual, Group Mean, and BVAR Forecasts of Percentage Changes in 
Industrial Production and Corporate Profits: Selected Comparisons, by 
Span and Subperiod, 1968-79 and 1979-90 
Forecasts for 1968:IV-l979:111  Forecasts for 1979:IV-1990:1 
RMSE Ratios  RMSE Ratios 
Median  Median 
Span  RMSE  iig  i/bv  gibv  RMSE  iig  i/bv  gibv 
Raw  (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Index of  Industrial Production (IP) 
~~ 
1  0-1  1.65  1.23  1.00  .91  1.49  1.30  1.22  .83 
2  0-2  2.95  1.16  1.01  .92  3.13  1.09  1.42  1.07 
3  cL3  4.17  1.17  1.09  .95  4.54  1.11  1.65  1.21 
4  04  4.96  1.14  1.14  1.00  5.84  1.10  1.70  1.29 
5  0-5  5.37  1.18  1.03  1.28  6.98  1.08  1.64  1.35 
Corporate Profits after Taxes (CP) 
6  0-1  9.13  1.06  1.48  1.40  10.08  1.06  1.37  1.20 
7  0-2  14.12  1.08  1.32  1.25  15.06  1.05  1.44  1.25 
8  0-3  17.62  1.05  1.17  1.13  19.06  1.08  1.47  1.29 
9  &4  20.93  1.06  1.17  1.09  22.66  1.07  1.52  1.32 
10  0-5  23.52  1.06  1.12  1.06  25.93  1.06  1.47  1.31 
Nore: The symbols i, g, and bv refer to the individual, group mean, and BVAR  forecasts, variant A, 
respectively. RMSE, is the median of the RMSEs of the sampled forecasts (cols. 1 and 5). The i/g ratio 
is RMSEJRMSE, for strictly matching observations, and the iibv ratio is RMSEJRMSE,,,  with medians 
of  the individual forecasts used in each case (cols. 2 and 6 and cols. 3 and 7, respectively). The gibv 
ratio is RMSEJRMSE,,  (cols. 4 and 8). See also the notes to tables 1.13 and 1.14. 
1.18, cols. 4 and 6). The RMSE ratios i/g are generally higher for UR  than 
for HS, but, once again, the Q, ratios are close to one throughout; that is, 
about 75 percent of the individual forecasts are less accurate than the group 
means in either case (table 1.19, cols. 2-4).  The variant A BVAR forecasts 
are about as accurate as the group mean forecasts for target quarters 3-5  of 
both UR  and HS; for closer targets, the comparisons favor the surveys for UR 
and the BVAR for HS (cf. the corresponding entries in cols. 1-4 and 5-8). 
Table 1.20 shows that, on the whole, the NBER-ASA forecasters predicted 
UR  somewhat better and HS somewhat worse in  1968-79  than in  1979-90 
(cf. cols. 1 and 5). The relative performance of the group mean and the indi- 
vidual forecasts was very similar in the two periods (cols. 2 and 6); that of the 
BVAR variant A model improved in most cases for UR but showed no system- 
atic change for HS (cols. 3-7  and 4-8). Table 1.18  Selected Measures of Forecast Accuracy and Actual Values: Levels of the Unemployment Rate and Housing Starts, by 
Target Quarter, 1968-90 
Mean Error  Root Mean Square Error  Actual Value 
Target  M  SD  MD  M  SD  MD  SK  KU  M  SD  RMSV 
Row  Quarter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (1 1) 
Unemployment Rate (UR)' 
1  I  .02  .08  .03  .26  .21  .21  4.93  27.12  6.50  1.61  6.70 
2  2  -  .01  .13  .01  .52  .20  .49  3.83  19.92 
3  3  -  .08  .20  -.07  .77  .23  .73  2.31  11.73 
4  4  -  .20  .28  -.I9  .98  .26  .97  1.22  5.93 
5  5  -  .22  .34  -.29  1.15  .25  1.13  .53  .65 
Housing Starts (HS)b 
6  1  -  .04  .06  -.03  .23  .04  .23  -.01  .08  1.65  .38  1.69 
I  2  -  .03  .09  p.02  .29  .05  .29  .I8  .61 
8  3  -  .oo  .I2  .01  .34  .Ol  .34  .61  2.23 
9  4  .03  .I5  .03  .38  .09  .38  .72  3.32 
10  5  .06  .18  .08  .42  .I0  .41  .69  2.45 
"Based  on presently available data (no important revisions) 
bBased on the second revision of  the monthly data. 53  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
Table 1.19  Individual, Group Mean, and BVAR Forecasts of Levels of the 
Unemployment Rate and Housing Starts: Selected Comparisons, by Target 
Quarter, 1968-90 
Group  RMSE Ratios i/g  RMSE Ratios iibv 
Mean  BVAR' 
Target  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q,  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q, 
Row  Quarter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Unemployment Rate (UR)b 
1  1  .16  1.19  1.42  1.73  .28  .72  .84  .96 
2  2  .41  1.05  1.17  1.32  .50  .89  1.02  1.23 
3  3  .65  1.01  1.10  1.23  .66  .96  1.16  1.38 
4  4  .86  .98  1.09  1.20  .78  1.07  1.25  1.50 
5  5  1  .OO  .99  1.10  1.20  .85  1.14  1.30  1.71 
Housing Starts (HS)' 
6  1  .21  .99  1.06  1.16  .13  1.52  1.78  1.99 
7  2  .25  1.00  1.07  1.18  .20  1.30  1.41  1.60 
8  3  .29  1.02  1.08  1.19  .27  1.15  1.25  1.38 
9  4  .33  .98  1.10  1.16  .32  .99  1.13  1.22 
10  5  .36  .99  1.07  1.18  .37  .93  1.04  1.16 
'For IP, based on a model with six variables (RGNP, IPD, M2, L1, TBR, and UR) and six quarterly lags, 
estimated sequentially with presently available data. For HS, based on a model with six variables (RGNP, 
IPD, M2, LI, TBR, and HS) and six quarterly lags, estimated sequentially with presently available data. 
See the text and the appendix. BVAR variant A is used throughout. 
OBased on presently available data 
cBased on the second revision of  the monthly data. 
1.5  Comparisons with Selected Econometric and rime-Series 
Model Forecasts 
1.5.1  The University of Michigan Research Seminar in 
Quantitative Economics 
The Michigan Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics (RSQE) has 
the longest record of  the several well-known service bureaus working with 
macroeconometric forecasting models. RSQE kindly provided us with the re- 
cord of their forecasts, and we were able to compare them with the NBER- 
ASA survey forecasts for ten variables. It is important to note that the quar- 
terly Michigan forecasts begin in 1970:IV and were not made in the first quar- 
ter in the years 1975 and 1976 and in the second quarter in the years 1971-75 
and 1977-79.12  We  matched the Michigan (Mi) and the NBER-ASA (i) fore- 
casts period by period. Further, the Michigan predictions were made typically 
in March, June (occasionally May), August (rarely September) and November 
12. RSQE predicts normally eight times in each year. 54  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
Table 1.20  Individual, Group Mean, and BVAR Forecasts of the Unemployment 
Rate and Housing Starts: Selected Comparisons, by Target Quarter 
and Subperiod, 1968-79 and 1979-90 
Forecasts for  1968:IV-l979:III  Forecasts for 1979:IV-1990:1 
RMSE Ratios  RMSE Ratios 
Median  Median 
Target  RMSE,  iig  iibv  gibv  RMSE,  iig  iibv  g/bv 
Row  Quarter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Unemployment Rate (UR) 
1  1  .21  1.34  .84  .58  .21  1.39  .82  .57 
2  2  .45  1.15  .95  .80  .52  1.19  1.16  .84 
3  3  .66  1.06  .98  .95  .83  1.10  1.39  1.30 
4  4  .84  1.06  1.09  1.04  1.09  1.10  1.51  1.20 
5  5  .96  1.08  1.11  1.02  1.28  1.09  1.17  1.37 
Housing Starts (HS) 
6  1  .23  1.07  1.58  1.39  .23  1.03  1.93  1.80 
7  2  .30  1.08  1.39  1.24  .28  1.05  1.43  1.26 
8  3  .37  1.10  1.27  1.14  .30  1.07  1.23  1.01 
9  4  .42  1.08  1.11  1.07  .31  1.05  1.14  .98 
10  5  .45  1.05  1.01  1.01  .34  1.04  1.08  .98 
Nure: See table 1.17. 
(in 1974-75,  December). The NBER-ASA survey questionnaire was usually 
mailed in the first half of each quarter, but it was only in the last month of the 
quarter that all responses were collected. Thus, at least some of  the survey 
forecasts had the advantage of  later timing (which means more potentially 
useful up-to-date information) vis-2-vis the Michigan forecasts. 
Comparing the ME, MAE, and RMSE statistics for the Michigan and the 
NBER-ASA group means forecasts show the latter to have been more accurate 
for GNP,  RGNP, and IPD (cf. cols.  1-3  and 4-6  of  table 1.21). Consistent 
evidence comes from the RMSE ratios that have ranges of approximately 0.7- 
0.9, 0.9-1.1,  and  1  .O-1.3  for Q,, MD,  and Q3, respectively  (cols. 7-9). 
Thus, generally about half or more of the individual forecasts from the sur- 
veys were at least somewhat more accurate than the Michigan forecasts. 
The results for the other variables are mixed. As shown in table 1.22, the 
Michigan predictions of  real consumption show on the whole larger errors 
than the NBER-ASA “consensus,” but not by much, and not for the longest 
horizon (rows 1-5).  They are better than 50 percent of the individual survey 
forecasts for the two shortest spans and better than 75 percent for the three 
longest spans. The comparisons for real nonresidential investment favor the 
group averages by modest margins, except again for the longest span covered. 
For  real residential investment, the Michigan forecasts are definitely better 55  Twenty-two Years of  NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
Table 1.21  Michigan (RSQE) Econometric Forecasts and NBER-ASA Survey 
Forecasts of Nominal and Real GNP Growth and IPD Inflation Rates, 
by Span, 1970-90 
RMSE Ratios 
Michigan Forecasts  Group Mean Forecasts  i/Mi 
M  MAE  RMSE  M  MAE  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q, 
Row  Span (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
1  0-1 
2  0-2 
3  0-3 
4  0-4 
5  0-5 
6  GI 
7  (3-2 
8  0-3 
9  04 
10  0-5 
11  0-1 
12  0-2 
13  04 
14  04 
15  0-5 
Gross National Product (GNP) 
-.09  .80  1.08  -.09  .51  .66  .56  .73  .95 
.I3  1.24  1.60  -.07  .91  1.18  .73  .89  1.05 
.34  1.45  1.91  .02  1.33  1.73  ,951.11  1.27 
.51  1.81  2.38  .04  1.64  2.15  N.A.  1.00  1.26 
.97  2.15  2.95  -.02  1.99  2.61  .76  1.00  1.19 
~~ 
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP) 
.01  .77  1.02  -.05  .51  .66  .56  .75  .99 
.25  1.09  1.49  .01  .88  1.16  .75  .91  1.13 
.46  1.34  1.77  .I4  1.19  1.64  .91  1.09  1.28 
.77  1.58  2.18  .I9  1.32  1.89  .81  .97  1.30 
1.20  1.96  2.88  .29  1.61  2.32  .75  .94  1.18 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) 
-.I0  .39  .51  -.03  .27  .34  .71  .88  1.17 
-.I4  .72  .87  -.08  .  .52  .68  .81  .97  1.17 
-.15  1.00  1.32  -.12  .76  1.05  .78  .90  1.05 
-.27  1.40  1.98  -.14  1.12  1.56  .78  ,891.02 
-.28  1.78  2.42  -.I8  1.57  2.20  .87  .98  1.12 
Nore: The Michigan forecasts cover the period 197O:IV-1990:1,  except for the following quarters: 
197131, 197231,  197331, 197451, 19753, 197531, 19763, 1977:11,  1978:II, and  1979:II. We 
match the NBER-ASA forecasts to the Michigan forecasts period by period. The ratios in cols. 
7-9  are RMSEjRMSE,,,  where the subscript i refers to individual forecasts from the NBER- 
ASA surveys and the subscript Mi refers to the Michigan forecasts. 
than all but the shortest group mean forecasts. National defense expenditures 
are predicted better by the surveys through span 0-3  and better by  Michigan 
(Mi) for the two longer spans. More than half of the RMSE ratios i/Mi for NFI 
(nonresidential fixed  investment),  RFI  (residential fixed  investment), and 
DEF (national defense expenditures) are less than one (rows 6-20). 
The pattern that the NBER-ASA group mean forecasts have an edge for the 
two shortest spans and the Michigan forecasts for the two longest spans holds 
for the unemployment rate  and the  Treasury-bill rate  (TBR) in table  1.23 
(rows 1-5  and 6-10).  The middle span shows about equal RMSEs for the two 
sets. The corporate bond yield (CBY) predictions from Michigan outperform 
those from the surveys for all but the shortest span (rows 11-15). 56  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
Table 1.22  Michigan (RSQE) Econometric Forecasts and NBER-ASA Survey 
Forecasts of Percentage Changes in Consumption, Investment, and 
Defense Expenditures, by  Span, 1981-90 and 1968-81 
RMSE Ratios 
Michigan Forecasts  Group Mean Forecasts  iiMi 
M  MAE  RMSE  M  MAE  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q, 









































Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) 
-.I2  .56  .76  -.I4  .47  .59  .82  .89  1.56 
-.I9  .73  .89  -.24  .64  .77  .78  .97  1.25 
-.26  .93  1.15  -.39  .84  .99  .98  1.15  1.41 
-.35  1.10  1.34  p.51  1.04  1.25  .94  1.21  1.52 
-.41  1.21  1.51  -.66  1.28  1.56  .92  1.30  1.51 
Nonresidential Fixed Investment (NFI) 
-.63  2.04  2.65  -.49  1.68  2.10  .71  .93  1.18 
-  1.04  3.25  4.26  -.93  2.74  3.52  .81  1.00  1.29 
-  1.09  4.91  5.94  -  1.38  4.03  5.23  .70  .87  1.09 
-.95  6.47  7.48  -1.71  5.57  7.09  .76  .93  1.16 
-.84  7.71  8.68  -2.16  7.57  9.11  .82  1.10  1.33 
Residential Fixed Investment (RFI) 
-.34  2.53  3.54  -.87  2.15  3.29  .79  1.36  1.57 
-.30  3.89  5.93  -1.99  4.34  7.55  .92  1.20  1.79 
.31  5.26  7.57  -3.72  6.51  11.43  .92  1.11  1.37 
1.36  6.59  9.02  -5.43  8.43  14.32  .94  1.16  1.29 
2.32  8.19  10.56  -7.51  10.55  17.46  .93  1.14  1.26 
National Defense Expenditures (DEF) 
-.09  2.18  2.54  -.07  1.44  2.00  .85  .98  1.20 
-.28  2.89  3.65  .56  2.28  3.08  .84  1.04  1.19 
-.49  3.75  4.52  -  1.49  3.13  4.09  .74  .92  1.15 
-.65  4.03  4.76  -2.14  4.34  5.23  .79  1.01  1.25 
-.95  5.84  6.83  -3.64  5.45  7.07  .67  .80  .99 
Note: See table  1.21 
1.5.2  Sims’s Probabilistic Forecasts 
In addition to outside econometric model forecasts, we wished to compare 
the results of  the NBER-ASA surveys to outside time-series forecasts. We  are 
indebted to Chris Sims for data on predictions from both sophisticated BVAR 
and univariate ARIMA models. 
Recall that our own BVAR model used earlier in this paper includes RGNP, 
IPD, TBER, M2, and LI plus the variable predicted (if not one of the above). 
The Sims model includes the first three variables in our set plus six others: 57  Twenty-two Years of  NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
Table 1.23  Michigan (RSQE) Econometric Forecasts and NBER-ASA Forecasts 
of the Unemployment Rate, 'Iteasury-Bill Rate, and Corporate Bond 
Yield, by Target Quarter, 1968-90 and 1981-90 
RMSE Ratios 
Michigan Forecasts  Group Mean Forecasts  iiMi 
Target  M  MAE  RMSE  M  MAE  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q, 
Row  Quarter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
1  1 
2  2 
3  3 
4  4 
5  5 
6  1 
7  2 
8  3 
9  4 
10  5 
11  1 
12  2 
13  3 
14  4 
15  5 
Unemployment Rate, 1968-90  (UR) 
.05  .I4  .I7  .02  .13  .I7  1.07  1.32  1.72 
.08  .33  .44  .05  .33  .43  1.03  1.15  1.35 
.05  .49  .67  .03  .51  .68  1.01  1.16  1.32 
-  .01  .58  .78  .OO  .61  .85  1.08  1.21  1.38 
-.I1  .69  .93  -.02  .71  .96  1.01  1.18  1.33 
Treasury-Bill Rate, 1981-90  (TBR) 
-  .04  .24  .31  .01  .I5  .20  .96  1.17  1.58 
-  .05  .79  1.07  .15  .69  .91  .85  .96  1.19 
.07  1.37  1.64  .62  1.45  1.80  1.05  1.25  1.39 
.21  1.67  1.90  .87  1.72  2.16  1.06  1.25  1.52 
-.01  1.13  1.39  .38  1.11  1.40  ,971.11  1.32 
Corporate Bond Yield,  1981-90  (CBY) 
-  .44  .48  .63  -.I9  .31  .38  .73  .97  1.26 
-  .20  .84  1.08  .I6  1.05  1.25  1.23  1.36  1.50 
-  .3  I  .64  .81  -.07  .66  .83  1.17  1.28  1.55 
-.I2  1.17  1.43  .37  1.32  1.53  1.08  1.23  1.39 
-.03  1.39  1.68  .57  1.48  1.74  1.02  1.12  1.32 
Note: See table 1.2  1. 
M1, UR, NFI, the S&P 500 stock price index, a commodity price index, and 
the trade-weighted value of the dollar.13 It is a nine-variable, five-lag model, 
whereas ours is a five- or six-variable, six-lag model. 
Sims's model is an extension of the model constructed in 1980 and used in 
quarterly forecasting during 1980-86  by  Litterman (1986). It is three vari- 
ables larger than the original Litterman model, and it allows time variation in 
coefficients, predictable time variation in forecast error variance, and nonnor- 
mality in disturbances (Sims 1989). The modifications give rise to nonnormal, 
nonlinear models and hence to considerable complications in estimation and 
analysis (Sims and Todd  1991). The Sims model (like our own BVAR) fore- 
casts are simulations of real-time forecasts in that they use only data from time 
periods before the periods to be predicted. But, for several reasons, including 
13. The data are generally expressed in log-level form, except for TBR, which was not logged. 58  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
the use of current versions of the data, they are far from being true ex ante 
forecasts (again, the same applies to our BVAR as well). 
In evaluating the BVAR forecasts (both Sims’s and our own), we used the 
current data, which  is consistent with their construction  and believed  to be 
fair. Use of preliminary figures would have resulted in finding larger errors. 
Again, like for our own BVAR (see table  I.  13 and text above), the compar- 
isons of the Sims model forecasts with the NBER-ASA survey forecasts for 
GNP, RGNP, and IPD are presented in two variants, A and B (table 1.24). For 
reasons already explained, variant A favors the real-time predictions that in- 
corporate contemporary news evaluations,  while variant B favors the predic- 
tions based on the ex post constructed time-series models. 
Using variant A, Sims’s forecasts (S) are found to have on the whole larger 
errors than the group mean forecasts from the NBER-ASA surveys for both 
GNP and RGNP (table 1.24, rows 1-5  and 11-15;  cf. cols. 1-3  and 4-6).  The 
corresponding ratios RMSEJRMSE, are relatively low, approaching  1 .OO only 
for Q,  (cols. 7-9),  which means that most individual forecasts from the sur- 
veys are more accurate than the Sims model forecasts. In contrast, the Sims 
forecasts are considerably  more accurate than the group mean forecasts for 
IPD inflation, and here the RMSE ratios i/S mostly exceed 1  .OO,  even for Q, 
(rows 2 1-25). 
Using variant B as a criterion (rows 6-10,  16-20,  and 26-30),  we still see 
the group mean forecasts as retaining on balance an advantage over the Sims 
forecasts  for GNP,  but  it  is a much-reduced  advantage and one essentially 
limited to the longer spans. For RGNP, the NBER-ASA consensus predictions 
are somewhat more accurate than the Sims model predictions  for the spans 
0-4  and 0-5,  whereas the opposite is true for the shorter spans.  For IPD, 
the Sims forecasts have  smaller errors throughout.  (Compare cols.  1-3  for 
variant B with the corresponding entries in cols. 4-6.)  Looking at the RMSE 
ratios i/S (cols. 7-9),  we find them to exceed 1  .OO,  that is, to favor the Sims 
model, for GNP at Q, only, for RGNP at MD and Q,,  and for IPD at Q,,  MD, 
and Q,. 
Interestingly,  the original  Litterman  BVAR performed  relatively well for 
real GNP and unemployment but worse for IPD, which motivated both Litter- 
man and Sims to make changes designed to improve their inflation forecasts. 
But simulations disclosed  “a tendency for improvements in the retrospective 
forecast performance of the BVAR model for inflation to be accompanied by 
deterioration in its performance for real variables” (Sims 1989, 1). A similar 
trade-off was observed in working with our own BVAR. 
According to the measures in table 1.25 (based on variant A only), most of 
the NBER-ASA survey forecasts for the unemployment  rate (1968-90),  the 
Treasury-bill  rate  (1981-90),  and  the rate of  growth  in real  nonresidential 
fixed investment (198  1-90)  exceeded the corresponding Sims model forecasts 
considerably  in overall accuracy. This can be concluded from both the com- 59  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
Table 1.24  Sims Model Forecasts (Two Variants) and NBER-ASA Survey Forecasts of 
Nominal and Real GNP Growth and IPD Inflation, by Span, 1968-90  and 
1981-90 
Sims Model Forecasts (S)  Group Mean Forecasts  RMSE Ratios I/S 
Span  M  MAE  RMSE  M  MAE  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q, 

























































Gross National Product.  1968-90  (GNP): Variant A 
.o  I  .86  1.09  -.OX  .49  .64  .51  .66  .89 
.01  1.31  1.68  -.I0  .84  1.1 I  .62  .79  .94 
-.05  1.87  2.34  -.07  1.22  1.61  .62  .79  .93 
-.20  2.74  3.48  -.09  1.91  2.51  .65  .80  1.08 
GNP. 1968-90:  Variant B 
-.I1  2.32  2.93  -.02  1.56  2.06  .65  .79  .98 
0  0  0 
.  00  .85  1.08 
.02  1.29  1.66 
.08  1.85  2.33 
.IS  2.29  2.90 
N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
.70  .84  .98 
.81  .93  1.10 
.74  .88  1.09 
.78  .88  1.10 
GNP in Constant Dollars.  1968-90  (RGNP): Variant A 
.03  .78  .99  -.02  .SO  .64  .63  .77  .98 
.05  1.18  1.50  .02  .83  1.11  .73  .86  1.06 
.04  1.68  2.12  .I6  1.17  1.61  .75  .89  1.05 
.02  2.10  2.66  .33  1.42  2.05  .79  .93  1.08 
-.03  2.54  3.15  .40  1.70  2.47  .80  .96  1.12 
RGNP, 1968-90:  Variant B 
0  0  0 
-  .02  .79  1.00 
-.03  1.19  1.51 
p.03  1.70  2.14 
.OO  2.11  2.68 
N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
.81  .96  1.11 
.99  1.12  1.27 
.97  1.12  1.30 
1.01  1.13  1.36 
Implicit Price Deflator. 1968-90  (IPD): Variant A 
.o  I  .30  .38  -.04  .27  .34  .71  .88  1.17 
.04  .54  .68  -.I2  .55  .70  1.81  .97  1.17 
.08  .75  .95  -.22  .84  1.13  1.24  1.46  1.73 
.I2  1.01  1.25  -.34  1.21  1.64  1.35  1.58  1.85 
.I6  1.29  1.59  -.37  1.63  2.23  1.40  1.68  1.99 
IPD, 1968-90:  Variant B 
0  0  0 
.02  .31  .39 
-  .05  .55  .69 
N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
1.31  1.52  1.81 
1.43  1.63  1.91 
(conrinued) 60  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
Table 1.24  (continued) 
Sims Model Forecasts (S)  Group Mean Forecasts  RMSE Ratios iiS 
29  &4  -.09  .76  .96 
30  65  -.I4  1.02  1.26 
1.51  1.68  1.90 
1.47  1.71  1.98 
Nore: Sims’s model is a nine-variable, five-lag quarterly probabilistic model (see the text for more detail). 
The Sims forecasts contain no gaps and refer to the same periods as those covered by  the NBER-ASA 
survey forecasts (individual and group means). The entries in cols. 7-9  represent ratios RMSE/RMSE,, 
where the subscript i refers to individual forecasts from the surveys and the subscript S refers to the Sims 
model forecasts.  Q, and Q,  denote the lower- and upper-quartile ratios.  and  MD denotes the median 
ratio. Variant A assumes that the last known values of the variables to the predicted refer to the quarter 
t - I  (denoted 0); variant B assumes that they refer to the current quarter t (denoted  I). N.A.  = not 
available. 
parisons with group mean predictions from the  surveys (cf. cols.  1-3  and 
4-6)  and the low i/S ratios (cols. 7-9). 
The Sims model and our own BVAR forecasts have errors of generally sim- 
ilar orders of magnitude. The Sims predictions are more accurate for GNP and 
IPD, less accurate for RGNP and UR. The results for NFI and TBR are mixed 
(favoring Sims at the two longest horizons only).I4 
1  S.3  Univariate Time-Series Models 
Predictions from ARIMA models make popular benchmarks for evaluating 
forecasters’ performance.  We  use  ARIMA  as specified in  Sims and  Todd 
(1991), where they are reported to have worked well relative to the Simsian 
BVAR for financial variables and business fixed investment in 1980-90  (pp. 
9-10).  However, our measures show that, throughout, Sims’s BVAR forecasts 
had smaller overall errors than the corresponding ARIMA forecasts, whether 
the comparisons cover the variants A or the variants B (cf. tables 1.24 and 
1.25, cols. 1-3,  with tables 1.26 and 1.27, cols. 2-4). 
The results of comparing the NBER-ASA survey forecasts with their coun- 
terparts of  the Sims-Todd ARIMA type are less clear-cut. Most of the fore- 
casters did better than the time-series models according to the variant A cal- 
culations,  as  is  evident  from  the  individual-to-ARIMA (i/Ar)  ratios  in 
columns 5-7  of tables 1.26 and 1.27. But, when variant B is used, the fore- 
casters are no longer clearly ahead for RGNP and fall somewhat behind for 
IPD (table 1.26, rows 16-20  and 26-30). 
Beginning in  1976:II, Charles Nelson has produced ARIMA forecasts of 
rates of change in nominal and real GNP and the implicit price deflator syn- 
chronously with other real-time forecasts, updating them each quarter on the 
14.  For the RMSEs of  the BVAR forecasts, see table  1.13, col. 3 (GNP, RGNP, IPD), and 
tables 1.19, 1A.6, and 1A.8,  col. 5 (UR, NFI, and TBR, respectively). Table 1.25  Sims Model Forecasts (Variant A) and NBER-ASA Survey Forecasts of the 
Unemployment Rate, the 'keasury-Bill  Rate, and Growth in Real Nonresidential 
Investment, by Target Quarter or Span, 1968-90  and 1981-90 
Target  Sims Model Forecasts  Group Mean Forecasts  RMSE Ratios iiS 
Quarter 
or Span  M  MAE  RMSE  M  MAE  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q, 
Row  (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Unemployment Rate, 1968-90  (UR) 
1  1  .09  .39  .55  .03  .I3  .I6  .35  .45  .55 
2  2  .I4  .56  .79  .04  .32  .41  .54  .65  .81 
3  3  .I8  .76  1.03  -.OO  .49  .65  .59  .71  .93 
4  4  .21  .95  1.23  -  .08  .63  .86  .64  .78  .94 
5  5  .23  1.10  1.40  -.I0  .73  1.00  .66  .79  .98 
Treasury-Bill Rate,  198 1-90  (TBR) 
6  1  -  .34  1.27  1.57  .01  .15  .20  .20  .24  .29 
7  2  -  .54  1.47  1.84  .I3  .68  .90  .52  .62  .70 
8  3  -  .60  1.69  2.13  .35  1.09  1.38  .62  .71  .82 
9  4  -  .7l  1.96  2.48  .61  1.41  1.77  .67  .76  .86 
10  5  -.86  2.19  2.69  I .07  1.87  2.49  .75  .86  .97 
Nonresidential Fixed Investment,  1981-90  (NFI) 
I1  GI  -.I6  2.31  2.93  -.45  1.61  2.01  .72  .85  1.01 
12  0-2  -  .31  3.61  4.16  -.88  2.67  3.43  .63  .72  1.01 
13  0-3  -.74  5.23  6.05  -1.19  3.93  4.99  .60  .67  .85 
14  a4  -.90  4.50  6.69  -1.74  5.51  6.89  .60  .65  .93 
15  0-5  -1.63  4.95  7.31  -2.31  7.29  8.69  .54  .65  .75 
Nore: See table 1.24. Table 1.26  ARIMA Model Forecasts ('ho  Variants) and NBER-ASA Survey Forecasts of 
Nominal and Real GNP Growth and IPD Inflation, by Span, 1968-90 
ARIMA Foreca\ts  RMSE Ratio\ i/Ar 
ARIMA 
Span  Model (Ar)  M  MAE  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q, 
Row  (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (6)  (7) 
I  GI 
2  62 
3  0-3 
4  @4 
S  0-5 
6  0-1 
7  &2 
8  0-3 
9  cL4 
10  G5 
I1  0-1 
12  cL2 
13  cL3 
14  w 
15  G5 
Gross National Product (GNP):  Variant A 
N.A.  -.I1  .9s  1.18  .48  .61  .82 
-  .29  1.64  2.05  .53  .64  .74 
-  .55  2.5  I  3.04  .Sl  .6  I  .73 
-  .85  3.32  4.00  .s  I  .sx  .69 
-  1.19  4.1 I  4.96  .49  .61  .74 
GNP: Variant B 
N.A.  0  0  0  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
.I2  .94  1.18  .64  .ll  .  86 
.32  I .62  2.02  .71  .XI  .95 
.59  2.48  3.01  .61  .7  I  .87 
.91  3.28  3.96  .59  .74  .94 
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP): Variant A 
1.1.0  -  .06  .80  I .03  .60  .74  .94 
-  .I4  I .33  I .68  .67  .79  .94 
~  .27  1.91  2.33  .71  .82  I .oo 
-  .40  2.37  2.88  .71  .86  I .05 
-  .54  2.82  3.39  .76  .93  1.11 RGNP: Variant B 
16  0-1  1,I.O  0  0  0  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
17  0-2  .06  .8  I  I .04  .78  .93  I .08 
18  0-3  .I6  I .33  1.68  .9  I  I .04  1.21 
19  04  .28  I .93  2.35  .93  I .07  I .29 
20  0-5  .43  2.39  2.91  .99  1.11  I .34 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD): Variant A 
21  0-1  1.1.2  .05  .38  .50  .72  .93  1.11 
22  0-2  .I5  .80  I .oo  .71  .87  1.10 
23  w  .29  1.27  1.60  .68  .90  1.11 
24  04  .49  I .84  2.29  .65  .93  1.16 
25  0-5  .74  2.41  3.07  .63  I .02  I .28 
IPD: Variant B 
26  0-1  1,172  0  0  0  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
27  0-2  -  .05  .39  .5  1  .94  1.10  I .39 
28  0-3  -.I6  .80  I .01  .97  1.17  1.37 
29  04  ~  .32  1.27  1.62  .88  1.1 I  1.33 
30  0-5  -  .53  I .86  2.32  .79  1.14  1.40 
Note:  N.A.  = not  available  (forecasts  obtained from  those  for RGNP and IPD). The specifications of the 
ARIMA models are as in Sims and Todd (1991, table  1). For more detail, see Sims and Todd (1991, 3-4). The 
entries in cols. 5-6  represent ratios RMSEjRMSE,,,  where the subscript i refers to individual forecasts from 
the NBER-ASA surveys and the subscript Ar refers to the ARIMA model forecasts. Table 1.27  ARIMA Model Forecasts (Variant A) and NBER-ASA Survey Forecasts of the 
Unemployment Rate, the 'lkeasury-Bill Rate, and Growth in Real Nonresidential 
Investment, by Target Quarter or Span, 1968-90  and 1981-90 
ARIMA Forecasts  RMSE Ratios i/Ar  Target 
Quarter  ARIMA 
MAE  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q, 
(7) 
or Span  Model (Ar)  M 
(5)  (6)  Row  (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Unemployment Rate (UR) 
1  1  1,190  -  .25  .45  .65  .30  .36  .44 
2  2  -  .44  .67  .96  .44  .52  .60 
3  3  -  .63  .87  1.26  .50  .58  .68 
4  4  -  .80  I .07  1.50  .56  .63  .74 
5  5  -  .94  1.21  I .67  .58  .66  .76 
Treasury-Bill Rate (TBR) 
6  1  0,1,1  -  .39  I .37  I .96  .I5  .19  .26 
7  2  -  .66  1.60  2. I4  .42  .49  .61 
8  3  -  .80  1.88  2.59  .53  .60  .72 
9  4  -  .96  2.26  3.19  .51  .65  .72 
10  5  -  1.19  2.51  3.49  .59  .69  .78 
Nonresidential Fixed Investment (NFI) 
11  0-1  1,190  -  .07  I .63  2.37  .58  .84  1.21 
12  0-2  -  .16  3.32  4.27  .65  .78  .98 
13  G3  -  .22  5.10  6.26  .58  .64  .81 
15  0-4  -  .22  6.76  8.11  .50  .59  .65 
16  0-5  -.I6  8. I9  9.69  .40  .48  .56 
Note: See table 1.26 Table 1.28  Joutz Model Forecasts and NBER-ASA Survey Forecasts of Nominal and Real 
GNP Growth and IPD Inflation, by Span, 1976-90 
Joutz Model Forecasts (J)  Group Mean Forecasts (8)  RMSE Ratios i/J 
Span  M  MAE  RMSE  M  MAE  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q, 
Row  (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Gross National Product (GNP) 
.96  -.05  .55  .70  .73  .89  1.25  1  0-1  .04  .72 
2  cL2  .09  1.21  1.52  -.02  .89  1.16  .85  1.08  1.26 
3  0-3  .16  1.65  2.08  .08  1.30  1.69  1.00  1.18  1.64 
4  04  .28  2.05  2.58  .18  1.63  2.15  .94  1.14  1.39 
Gross National Product in Constant Dollars (RGNP) 
5  0-1  .02  .64  .85  -.08  .53  .65  .86  1.07  1.40 
6  0-2  .08  1.05  1.31  -.I0  .81  1.03  .84  1.03  1.45 
7  0-3  .I8  1.38  1.68  -  .05  1.03  1.35  .95  1.21  1.55 
8  04  .30  1.53  1.90  -  .04  1.12  1.57  .89  1.12  1.51 
Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) 
9  GI  .01  .29  .37  .04  .24  .30  .86  1.07  1.40 
10  G2  .OO  .53  .65  .09  .43  .52  .78  .96  1.30 
11  0-3  -.03  .73  .96  .I5  .61  .75  .80  .98  1.21 
12  0-4  -.04  1.05  1.33  .21  .89  1.06  .79  .97  1.28 66  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
announcement  of  the  first  preliminary  numbers  for the  preceding  quarter. 
Comparisons  with five econometric  models for the period  1976:11-1982:1V 
have shown these ex ante “benchmark” forecasts to be of  competitive accu- 
racy (Nelson 1984). Since 1988, Frederick Joutz has been preparing the AR- 
IMA forecasts on a current basis (the same way as Nelson had before), and he 
kindly let us have the results for the purposes of a comparative analysis. 
Table  1.28 shows that the NBER-ASA  group mean forecasts (g) were on 
average consistently more accurate than the Joutz ARIMA (J) forecasts (cf. 
cols. 2-5  and 3-6). The RMSE ratios giJ rose with the span from 0.73 to 0.88 
for GNP and from 0.76 to 0.83 for RGNP; they varied irregularly between 
0.78 and 0.81 for IPD. The RMSE ratios i/J (cols. 7-9)  average 0.8-0.9  for 
Q,, 1 .O-1.1  for MD, and  1.3-1.5  for Q,.  Our analysis confirms the findings 
that these ARIMA forecasts are indeed competitive and that their relative ac- 
curacy tends to improve with their horizon for GNP and RGNP (but not for 
IPD, where they are weakest). 
1.6  A General Evaluation and Conclusions 
In presenting and discussing more than thirty  tables on multiperiod  quar- 
terly forecasts for a score of  variables  by  a total of  more than one hundred 
individuals, we had to make some hard choices about which problems to con- 
front and which measures to use.  Forecasts for two-thirds of the time series 
covered were treated less comprehensively and relegated to an appendix, to 
make the paper easier to read.  Even  so, the inevitable abundance of  detail 
risks obscuring the overall picture. Therefore,  lest we miss the forest for the 
trees, a statement of general findings, conclusions,  and qualifications is very 
necessary at this point. 
1. The distributions of the error statistics show that there is much dispersion 
across the forecasts, which typically increases with the length of the predictive 
horizon.  Forecasters  differ in many respects,  and so do their products.  The 
idea that a close “consensus” persists, that is, that current matched forecasts 
are generally all alike, is a popular fiction. The differentiation of the forecasts 
usually  involves much more than the existence of just a few outliers.  How- 
ever, it is also true that forecasters depend on common information,  interact, 
and influence each other. This naturally induces some common trends.  The 
more independent information the individuals possess, the more their predic- 
tions can differ. Thus, a clustering of forecasts could be due either to genuine 
agreement or to common ignorance, while dissent may reflect uncertainty.  I5 
2.  Errors  of  the  average change  forecasts cumulate  over  the  spans 0-1, 
. . . ,  0-5  with great regularity for a variety of time series. To a large extent, 
15.  Compare Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), a study that compares the point and probabilistic 
forecasts from the NBER-ASA surveys. Time and space restrictions prevented us from including 
in  this paper the survey responses to questions on the probabilities of alternative GNP and IPD 
outcomes and turning points. See also Braun and Yaniv (1991). 67  Twenty-two Years of  NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
this occurs because of the progression to larger changes in the corresponding 
actual values. But the errors of marginal change and level forecasts, too, often 
increase with the distance to the target quarter, although by  much  smaller 
margins and with much less regularity. As might be expected, the further out 
in the future the target, the less can be inferred about it from the past, and the 
worse it is usually forecast. The less random and more predictable the series, 
the better this rule holds, in the sense that the forecasts will be more forward 
looking and more appropriately differentiated with the distance to the target 
period.  l6 
3. Macroeconomic variables differ greatly in the extent to which they can 
be forecast. The more persistent (autocorrelated) series are, of course, more 
accurately predicted than series with high random variability. Thus, real GNP 
and consumption are far easier to forecast than residential investment and, 
especially, change in business inventories. Inflation was underestimated and 
poorly predicted by most forecasters most of the time. Negative correlations 
between RGNP and IPD forecast errors have long been observed (see Zarnow- 
itz 1979, table 4 and text), and offsetting performance for inflation and real 
variables appears to be frequently encountered in studies of forecasting meth- 
ods and results. 
4. A comparison of  the summary measures of error for 1968:IV-l979:1II 
and  1979:IV-1990:1  reveals no large and systematic differences that would 
indicate either deterioration or improvement in the overall performance of the 
respondents to the NBER-ASA surveys. The accuracy of GNP forecasts may 
have decreased somewhat, but that of inflation forecasts increased. The 1970s 
and the  1980s differed significantly in a number of economically important 
dimensions, but it is difficult to say that either subperiod presented the fore- 
casts with definitely greater problems than the other. Each experienced two 
business recessions, which is noted because previous research has shown that 
turning-point errors played a major role in downgrading the forecasting re- 
cords (for a recent summary, see Zarnowitz 1992). 
5. Group mean forecasts are generally much more accurate than the major- 
ity  of  individual forecasts.  These consensus predictions are computed  by 
simple averaging across the corresponding responses to each successive sur- 
vey; we made no effort to use other than equal weighting. This paper, then, 
provides many examples of the rule that combining forecasts often results in 
substantial improvements. The method is very accessible and inexpensive. 
The gains are enhanced by  the diversification of  the forecasts that are com- 
bined; for example, our group mean forecasts should be better the more differ- 
ent and complementary the information embodied in their components. For 
some variables and periods, the combinations work much better than for oth- 
16.  It  should be noted that annual forecasts are generally more accurate than all but the very 
short quarterly forecasts, owing to cancellation of errors for the quarters within the year (Zarno- 
witz 1979). In this paper, annual forecasts are not considered. 68  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
Table 1.29  Nine Sets of Forecasts Ranked According to Their Average RMSEs, Three 
Variables, 1968:IV-1990:1 
Row  Forecast 
Gross National  GNP in Constant  Implicit Price 
Product (GNP)  Dollars (RGNP)  Deflator (IPD) 
ARMSE  Rank  ARMSE  Rank  ARMSE  Rank 





BVAR variant A 
BVAR variant B 
Sims variant A 





I .90  4 
1.586  1 
1.98  5 
2.69  8 
1.89  3 
2.30  7 
1.594  2 
3.05  9 










I  1.53  7 
3  1.21  5 
5  1.42  6 
6  I .62  8 
I  I .03  3 
8  .97  2 
2  .66  I 
9  1.69  9 
4  1.09  4 
Source: Row  1 is based on entries in table  I.  10, row  3,  cols. 1-5;  row 2 on table 1.9,  col. 6; row 3 or 
table 1.21, col. 3; rows 4 and 5 on table 1.13, col. 3; rows 6 and 7 on table I .24, col. 3; and rows 8 anc 
9 on table 1.26, col. 4. 
Note; ARMSE (average root mean square error) is computed by taking the mean of  the RMSEs across 
the five spans 0-1,  . . . ,  0-5.  The smallest ARMSE is ranked 1, the largest ARMSE 9, for each of  thc 
three variables. 
ers. In principle, one would prefer to combine the information in  a single 
model rather than combining the forecasts. In practice, the latter will typically 
be much easier. 
6. Consider first comparisons with time-series models constructed on the 
assumption that the last-known values of the variables concerned refer to the 
prior quarter t - 1 (variant A). The assumption is certainly valid for the quar- 
terly variables in the real-time forecasts, but it results in some bias against the 
time-series forecasts.  Table  1.29 sums up  the evidence in the form of  the 
RMSEs averaged across spans. For the subset consisting of  the median indi- 
vidual and the consensus forecasts from the NBER-ASA surveys, the Michi- 
gan econometric model, our BVAR variant A model, the Sims variant A prob- 
abilistic model, and the Sims-Todd ARIMA variant A model (rows 1-4,  6, 
and 8), the consensus (group mean) survey forecasts rank first for GNP and 
RGNP and second for IPD (following the Sims [variant A] model). 
7.  The alternative assumption, that the last-known values of the variables 
refer to the current quarter t (variant B), is rather strongly biased in favor of 
the ex post forecasts with time-series models. The average root mean square 
errors (ARMSEs) are all much lower for the variant B predictions than for 
their variant A counterparts (cf. rows 4,6,  and 8 with rows 5,7, and 9). When 
all nine sets of forecasts listed in table 1.29 are considered, the Sims variant 
B model ranks second, second, and first for GNP, RGNP,  and IPD, respec- 69  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
Table 1.30  Six Sets of Forecasts Ranked According to Their RMSEs Averaged across 
Spans, Wenty-one Variables, 1%8:1V-1990:1,  1968:IV-l981:II, and 
1981  :II-1990:1 
Average Root Mean Square Error (ARMSE) and the Corresponding Rankb 
NBER-ASA  Sims 
SUNeyS  Group  BVAR  Michigan  Probabilistic  ARIMA 
Forecast  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast 
Median Individual  (Consensus)  Model  (RSQE)  Model  Model 


















































1.59  2.69  1.98  2.30 
(1)  (5)  (3)  (4) 
1.58  1.90  1.87  2.08 
(1)  (3)  (2)  (5) 
1.21  1.62  1.42  .97 
(2)  (5)  (3)  (1) 
3.56  3.42  N.A.  N.A. 
(2)  (1) 
17.13  13.71  N.A.  N.A. 
(2)  (1) 
.62  .61  .60  I .oo 
(3)  (2)  (1)  (5) 
.29  .26  N.A.  N.A. 





















5.93  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
4.35  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
8.19  4.46  N.A.  N.A. 
13.94  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
(3) 
(1) 














26.69  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
(3) 
21.02  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
(1) 
5.69  1.13  N.A.  N.A. 
(4)  (1) 
5.25  5.80  5.43  6.14 
(2)  (4)  (3)  (6) 
8.70  10.81  N.A.  N.A. 
(2)  (4) 
8.54  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
(3) 
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Table 1.30  (continued) 
Average Root Mean Square Error (ARMSE) and the Corresponding Rankh 
NBER-ASA  Sims 
Surveys  Group  BVAR  Michigan  Probabilistic  ARIMA 
Forecast  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast 
Median Individual  (Consensus)  Model  (RSQE)  Model  Model 
Row  Variable*  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
18  SLGP  I .47 
(3) 
19  CPI  1.19 
(3) 
20  TBR  1.71 
(3) 
21  CBY  I .64 
(3) 
1.27  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
(2) 
.76  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
(2) 
2.03  1.26  2.14  2.61 
(4)  (1)  (5)  (6) 
1.72  1.13  N.A.  N.A. 
(4)  (1) 
Nore: N.A. = not available. 
.'On the symbols used, see previous tables and the text. 
hARMSE = average of the RMSEs across the five horizons (0-1.  . . . , 0-5, or  I, . . . ,  5). Entries in 
parentheses represent ranks according to ARMSE (smallest to largest). 
tively. The corresponding ranks of  BVAR  variant B are also high: third, first, 
and third. The NBER-ASA consensus forecasts are now  almost tied for the 
first rank with the Sims variant B and rank only third for RGNP and fifth for 
IPD (cf. rows 2,5,  and 7). 
8. Table  1.30 sums up the evidence on the comparative accuracy of  the 
several sets of forecasts included in this study, using the longest series of pre- 
dictions available for each variable. Here again, root mean square errors av- 
eraged across the spans serve as the basis for ranking the forecasts, but only 
the variant A time-series predictions are used. By  this criterion, the group 
forecasts from the NBER-ASA surveys earned ten first and ten second ranks 
for the twenty-one variables covered. The median individual forecasts ranked 
first or second six times, third eleven times, and lower four times. Our BVAR 
model had equal numbers in the first, second, and third ranks (five each), plus 
six lower ranks. The Michigan (RSQE) forecasts, available for ten variables, 
ranked first four times, second once, third three times, and fourth twice. The 
Sims probabilistic model forecasts, available for six variables, were mostly 
less accurate, and the ARIMA model forecasts were throughout least accu- 
rate. 
9. Finally, table 1.31, using sums of the ranks across variables, shows that 
the group (consensus) forecasts from the survey performed best overall in 
each of  the periods covered; the Michigan forecasts were  second best; the 
median individual forecasts, the BVAR  model forecasts, and the Sims fore- 
casts share mostly the ranks third or fourth (there are ties); and the ARIMAs 
rank last. Note that major deviations from this ordering appear for some vari- 
ables; notably, Michigan is best for UR, Sims for IP. Also, these results con- 71  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
Table 1.31  Six Sets of Forecasts Ranked According to Their Overall Accuracy across 
Variables, by Period, 1968:IV-1990:1, 1%8:1V-1981:11,  and 1981:11-1990:I 
Ranking According to the Sum  of Ranks across Variablesb 
Sims 
Individual  Group  BVAR  Michigan  Probabilistic  ARIMA 
Median  (Consensus)  Model  (RSQE)  Model  Model 
Number of  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast 
Row  Variables'  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
~~  ~ 
1968:IV-1990:1 
1  7 (1-7)  Third  First  Second  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
2  4 (1-3,  6)  Third  First  Fourth  Second  Fourth  Sixth 
(23)  (13)  (18) 
(14)  (7)  (15)  (9)  (15)  (36) 
1968:IV-198 1 :I1 
3  4 (8-1  1)  Second  First  Third  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
(8)  (6)  (1 1) 
~  ~~ 
1981  :II-1990:1 
4  10 (12-21)  Third  First  Second  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
5  5 (14-16,  20, 21)  Third  First  Fourth  Second  N.A.  N.A. 
6  2 (15, 20)  Fourth  First  Third  Second  Fourth  Sixth 
(30)  (14)  (27) 
(17)  (8)  (18)  (11) 
(8)  (3)  (6)  (5)  (8)  (12) 
Note: N.A. = not available. 
"Identified  by rows in table 1.30 (in parentheses). 
bSum of  the ranks from table 1.30 is given in parentheses. 
ceal the differences between the forecast horizons, which are sometimes im- 
portant (e.g., the Michigan forecasts would rate higher for the longer, and 
lower for the short, spans). 
10. It is important to emphasize that these comparisons concentrate on only 
one aspect of the forecasts and need not imply an overall superiority of any of 
them. For example, the econometric and time-series models are clearly much 
better defined, more easily explained, more easily replicated, and more inter- 
nally consistent than the survey forecasts. But the survey data collectively 
embody a great deal of apparently useful knowledge and information available 
to professional forecasters. An interesting project, which must be left for fu- 
ture research, would be to identify the best of  the individual forecasts from 
the  surveys and  to combine them  with each other and with very different 
model forecasts. Regressions of  actual values on  predictions from different 
sources and models would serve as one method for implementing this objec- 
tive. Given rich data from active forecasters and interesting models, studies 
of this type should yield useful lessons. 72  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
Appendix 
Forecasts of Diverse Macroeconomic Series, 1968-81 
and1981-90 
Selected Nominal Aggregates, 1968-81 
Current-dollar expenditures on durable consumer goods, business plant and 
equipment, and national defense (CD, PE, and DEF, respectively) all contrib- 
ute strongly to the cyclical nature and volatility of quarterly changes in GNP. 
DEF is generally treated as an important exogenous variable. 
The statistics for mean errors suggest that underestimates prevailed in the 
forecasts of CD and PE and overestimates in those of DEF, but there is much 
dispersion across the individual respondents here, which increases strongly 
with the forecast horizon (table 1A.  1, cols. 1-3).  The RMSE measures show 
much the same kind of progression (cols. 4-6).  The forecast errors generally 
are at least smaller than the actual percentage changes in CD, PE, and DEE 
but often not by much, as can be seen by comparing the corresponding entries 
in columns 4-6  and 9-1  1. Most of the SK and KU values are small, and only 
a few for CD and DEF may be significant (cols. 7 and 8). 
The gains from averaging across the individual forecasts are modest for CD 
and DEF and, perhaps surprisingly, barely existent for PE (table 1A.2, cols. 
1-4). The RMSE ratios for PE are closely clustered, indicating lack of differ- 
entiation among the forecasts for this variable. One possible reason may  be 
the availability and influence of the quarterly anticipation series for plant and 
equipment outlays. 
The RMSEs of our BVAR forecasts are larger than those of the group mean 
forecasts for CD and much larger for DEE In contrast, BVAR is found to be 
much more accurate than the survey averages for PE. Indeed, the RMSE ratios 
i/bv are relatively very low for CD and DEF and very high for PE throughout. 
(Compare the corresponding measures in cols. 1-4  and 5-8.) 
Finally, the NBER-ASA survey questionnaire used through 198  1:II asked 
for forecasts of  the levels of  inventory investment in current dollars (CBI), 
another  important  but  highly  volatile  and  hard-to-predict  variable.  Table 
1A.3 shows that the mean errors and root mean  square errors for CBI in- 
creased markedly with the span while the corresponding standard deviation 
did not (rows 1-5).  The M and MD statistics for mean errors are all positive 
here; the RMSE for target quarter 5 (i.e., t  + 4) is about equal to the actual 
RMSV 
Apparently, CBI is another of those rare cases in which combining the in- 
dividual survey forecasts is of little help. The group mean’s RMSE is rela- 
tively large, and even the lower-quartiie i/g ratios are close to one (see table 
1A.4, rows 1-5).  However, our BVAR model performs somewhat worse still 
here (cf. cols. 1-4  and 5-8). Table lA.l  Selected Measures of Forecast Accuracy and Actual Values: Percentage Changes in Expenditures for 
Consumer Durable Goods, Plant and Equipment, and National Defense, by Span, 1968-81 































Consumer Expenditures for Durable Goods (CD) 
-  .79  .73  -.87  3.60  1.06  3.42  .88  .I2  1.93  4.52  4.91 
-1.10  1.26  -1.18  5.35  1.80  4.95  3.97  24.35  3.96  6.00  7.19 
-  1.30  1.59  -1.26  6.30  1.52  5.96  1.45  2.69  5.89  7.12  9.24 
-.97  2.07  -.87  6.94  1.83  6.45  1.73  4.01  7.86  7.57  10.91 
-1.23  2.61  -.74  8.39  3.50  7.46  4.01  23.83  9.96  8.68  13.21 
Plant and Equipment Expenditures (PE) 
-.71  1.02  -.51  5.49  1.75  5.69  .06  p.89  2.34  6.10  6.53 
-1.24  1.89  -1.24  8.49  2.52  9.00  .40  -.I9  4.66  9.36  10.46 
-1.69  2.55  -1.95  11.51  2.84  11.82  -.07  -.70  6.89  11.99  13.83 
-1.83  3.12  -1.95  13.78  3.26  14.17  -.32  -.46  8.86  14.19  16.73 
-2.77  4.18  -2.46  16.46  3.68  16.79  -.60  .01  10.83  15.97  19.30 
National Defense Expenditures (DEF) 
.I6  .55  .24  2.33  .56  2.25  .54  .71  1.43  2.51  2.89 
.21  .97  .35  3.48  .97  3.41  .72  2.28  2.97  4.27  5.20 
.I7  1.52  .40  4.19  1.21  4.05  1.02  2.88  4.75  5.98  7.64 
.04  2.06  .34  4.80  1.57  4.51  1.80  6.39  6.60  7.58  10.05 
-.23  2.62  N.A.  5.79  1.94  5.38  2.21  8.93  8.60  9.55  12.85 
Note: On the symbols used, see previous tables and the text. 74  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
Table 1A.2  Individual, Group Mean, and BVAR Forecasts of Percentage Changes in 
Expenditures for Consumer Durable Goods, Plant and Equipment, and 
National Defense: Selected Comparisons, by Span, 1968-81 
RMSE Ratios iig  RMSE Ratios iibv 
Group Mean  BVAR 
Span  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q,  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q, 
Row  (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Consumer Expenditures for Durable Goods (CD) 
I  0-1  3.23  .95  1.12  1.34  3.98  .72  .93  1.05 
2  0-2  4.70  1.01  1.11  1.23  5.23  .88  1.02  1.15 
3  0-3  5.38  1.02  1.13  1.31  6.27  .88  .98  1.19 
4  c-4  5.50  1.06  1.16  1.36  6.74  .84  .96  1.13 
5  0-5  6.42  1.04  1.17  1.43  7.45  .83  .99  1.18 
Plant and Equipment Expenditures (PE) 
6  0-1  5.82  1.01  1.05  1.09  2.19  1.87  2.72  3.04 
7  0-2  8.96  1.01  1.07  1.10  3.16  2.19  2.83  3.33 
8  0-3  11.54  1.00  1.06  1.10  4.47  2.36  2.79  3.20 
9  c-4  13.76  1.00  1.05  1.12  5.51  2.39  2.70  3.30 
10  0-5  15.69  .98  1.05  1.13  6.41  2.50  2.89  3.55 
National Defense Expenditures (DEF) 
II  0-1  1.78  1.07  1.19  1.38  2.85  .66  .75  .87 
12  0-2  2.73  1.05  1.16  1.34  5.78  .47  .54  .63 
13  0-4  3.31  1.02  1.17  1.38  8.53  .38  .45  .54 
14  w  3.91  1.03  1.20  1.44  10.55  .35  .43  .SO 
15  0-5  4.96  1.05  1.22  1.44  13.25  .32  .38  .48 
Nofe:  On the symbols used, see previous tables and the text. 
Components of Real GNP, 1981-90 
After mid- 1981, the survey collected forecasts of the main GNP expendi- 
ture categories in constant dollars. We  start with real inventory investment 
(RCBI), to follow up on the preceding discussion. It turns out that the RCBI 
forecasts for 1981-90,  like the CBI forecasts for 1981-90,  have RMSEs that 
are large relative to the average actual levels and their variability, especially 
for the more distant target quarters (table 1A.3, rows 6-10).  The average MEs 
are negative but very small, the SDs large and stable. Again, little is gained 
by averaging the individual forecasts, but the group mean forecasts do have a 
distinct advantage over the BVAR forecasts (table 1A.4, rows 6-10). 
Similarly, real net exports (NX) were on the whole poorly predicted in the 
1980s, as seen from the large relative size of the summary error measures in 
table 1A.3, rows 11-15.  For NX, too, the group mean forecasts do not help 
much, but, in this case, the BVAR forecasts are found to be much more accu- 
rate (table 1A.4, rows 11-15). Table 1A.3  Selected Measures of Forecast Accuracy and Actual Values: Nominal and Real Inventory Investment 
and Real Net Exports, by Span, 1968-81 and 1981-90 
Mean Error  Root  Mean Square Error  Actual Value 
Target  M  SD  MD  M  SD  MD  SK  KU  M  SD  RMSV 
Row  Quarter  (I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Change in Business Inventories, 1968-81  (CBI) 
.43  2.07  .45  9.33  3.65  9.76  .I3  -.26  7.30  11.27  13.43 
.92  2.42  1.10  9.94  3.62  10.24  -.I9  -.49 
1.59  2.28  1.73  10.92  3.95  11.59  p.46  -.84 
2.57  2.53  2.78  11.63  3.77  11.84  -.34  -.43 






Change in Business Inventories in Constant Dollars,  I98 1-90  (RCBI) 
p.20  2.94  -.I8  18.27  4.64  18.58  .58  I .35  14.58  20.37  25.05 
-.47  3.57  .27  18.90  3.72  19.26  -.02  p.07 
-1.09  3.26  -.83  19.70  3.78  19.35  .47  .35 
-.08  3.73  -.64  20.46  4.10  20.25  .41  -.22 
-.69  4.41  -.58  21.06  4.47  21.03  .70  .75 






9.33  6.02  7.48  28.83  9.87  31.32  -.90  .35  -53.19  66.09  84.84 
14.52  8.81  12.99  37.89  12.21  40.35  -1.15  .94 
21.36  10.72  18.35  47.60  12.79  48.36  -1.02  1.21 
27.04  12.72  27.36  54.15  12.06  55.81  -  1.09  I .68 
31.53  15.13  28.56  60.21  12.31  60.63  -1.38  2.89 
Nore; On the symbols used, see previous tables and the text 76  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
Table lA.4  Individual, Group Mean, and BVAR Forecasts of Nominal and Real 
Inventory Investment and Real Net Exports: Selected Comparisons, by 
Span, 1968-81 and 1981-90 
Row - 
RMSE Ratios iig  RMSE Ratios iibv 
Group Mean  BVAR,* 
Target  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q,  RMSE  Ql  MD  Qi 
Quarter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Change in  Business Inventories,  1968-81  (CBI) 
I  10.57  .98  1.07  1.15  10.70  .83  1.03  1.15 
2  10.75  .97  1.07  1.18  13.32  .72  .89  1.02 
3  12.69  .99  1.07  1.16  14.17  .76  .95  1.07 
4  13.41  1.00  1.06  1.12  16.24  .78  .91  1.09 
5  14.50  1.00  1.05  1.12  15.28  .81  .99  1.12 






17.87  .96  1.03  1.14  19.78  .76  .91  1.08 
18.35  .99  1.06  1.12  25.95  .52  .72  .82 
19. I9  1.00  1.05  1.13  28.45  .50  .66  .80 
19.40  .97  1.06  1.20  29.38  .52  .68  .95 






Net Exports of  Goods and Services in Constant Dollars, 1981-90  (NX) 
28.04  1.00  1.03  1.07  13.28  2.06  2.30  2.60 
36.45  1.00  1.04  1.14  17.71  2.00  2.21  2.65 
44.91  .98  1.03  1.11  19.66  2.17  2.45  2.78 
52. I I  .98  1.03  1.10  23.08  2.16  2.36  2.51 
59.44  .97  1.02  1.08  31.39  1.79  1.94  2.13 
Note: On the symbols used, see previous tables and the text. 
One would  expect total consumption (PCE), the largest and  smoothest 
component of real GNP, to be the easiest to predict and in fact the best pre- 
dicted. A relatively small but smooth and presumably also well-predicted se- 
ries should be that of  state and local government purchases (SLGP). Federal 
government purchases (FGP) are more autonomous and volatile, hence more 
difficult to forecast. Residential fixed investment (RFI) is another hard prob- 
lem for the forecasters, although for different reasons: it is highly cyclical and 
an early leading series (construction lags behind housing permits and starts 
are short). Nonresidential fixed investment (NFI) has more persistence, more 
of an upward trend, and lags at cyclical turning points, which should make it 
more easily predicted than RFI. Also, NFI is anticipated with long leads by 
new  capital  appropriations and  contracts and  orders for  plant  and  equip- 
ment-but  these monthly  series on  business investment commitments are 
themselves very volatile. 
The evidence on  the forecasts of  percentage changes in PCE, NFI, RFI, 77  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
Table 1A.5  Selected Measures of Forecast Accuracy and Actual Values: Percentage 
Changes in Consumption, Investment, and Government Components of 
Real GNP, by Span, 1981-90 
Mean Error  Root Mean Square Error  Actual Value 
Span  M  SD  MD  M  SD  MD  SK  KU  M  SD  RMSV 
Row  (Qs)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 



















































-.I4  .20  -.I4  .83  .30  .68  1.61  2.17  .78  .69  1.04 
-.26  .29  -.29  1.10  .42  .94  1.81  2.67  1.58  .99  1.86 
-.47  .46  -.44  1.45  .51  1.27  1.96  3.74  2.44  1.22  2.73 
-.63  .65  -.59  1.80  .64  1.60  1.96  4.33  3.33  1.41  3.62 
-.85  .85  -.74  2.23  .86  2.00  2.03  4.02  4.22  1.69  4.55 
Nonresidential Fixed Investment (NFI) 
-.59  .91  -.71  2.85  2.10  2.43  5.07  26.62  1.05  2.00  2.80 
-  1.22  1.42  -1.26  4.53  1.91  4.07  3.99  18.39  2.21  4.40  4.92 
-1.47  1.88  -1.51  6.76  2.51  5.86  2.32  5.35  3.46  6.18  7.08 
-2.31  2.38  -2.36  8.47  2.14  7.97  1.43  1.69  4.87  7.85  9.24 
-2.76  3.14  -2.97  10.33  2.55  9.99  1.35  1.81  6.46  9.26  11.29 
Residential Fixed Investment (RFI) 
-.85  1.08  -.67  4.16  1.52  3.83  1.89  4.70  1.18  4.84  4.98 
-1.87  2.27  -1.42  7.56  2.48  7.18  .67  -.24  2.95  9.01  4.27 
-2.93  3.19  -2.32  10.23  3.28  10.14  .36  -.21  5.06  12.59  13.57 
-4.12  3.93  -3.56  12.68  4.26  12.42  .28  -.67  7.39  15.78  17.42 
-5.58  5.23  -4.94  14.95  5.07  14.40  .21  -.95  9.90  18.71  21.17 
Federal Government Purchases (FGP) 
~~ 
-.60  1.33  -.51  3.99  .81  3.77  .60  -.37  1.16  4.15  4.31 
-.79  1.50  -.90  5.25  1.32  5.03  1.49  3.63  2.22  5.24  5.69 
-.94  1.75  -1.21  5.35  1.43  5.01  1.78  4.47  3.09  5.28  6.12 
-.74  2.36  -1.35  5.91  3.06  5.27  3.75  17.22  4.00  4.85  6.29 
-1.55  2.70  -1.81  6.16  1.71  5.74  1.14  1.48  5.27  6.05  8.02 
~~ 
State and Local Government Purchases (SLGP) 
-.I3  .28  -.I7  .90  .33  .85  1.87  4.40  .52  .70  .87 
-.24  .52  -.26  1.24  .56  1.15  2.77  9.44  1.12  1.07  1.55 
-.38  .72  -.40  1.57  .77  1.52  2.61  9.42  1.72  1.32  2.17 
-.62  .88  -.58  1.89  .92  1.79  2.98  12.01  2.34  1.54  2.80 
-.92  1.09  -1.13  2.35  1.11  2.03  2.82  11.02  2.99  1.85  3.52 
Nore: On the symbols used, see previous tables and the text. 78  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
FGP, and SLGP is generally consistent with these priors. Thus, forecasts of 
growth in PCE four quarters ahead have errors averaging about half the actual 
percentage change (table 1A.5, rows  1-5).  This is not great, but fair, and in 
sharp contrast to the apparent failure of forecasts of inventory investment (the 
least predictable of the components of aggregate demand). The RMSEs of the 
NFI forecasts are much smaller than their counterparts for RFI (but the actual 
percentage changes are also smaller for NFI; compare the corresponding en- 
tries in rows 6-10  and 11-15).  The SLGP forecasts are definitely much more 
accurate than the FGP forecasts (cf. rows 16-20  and 21--25). 
The forecasts share some characteristics across all the variables. All the M 
and  MD statistics for mean  errors are negative,  suggesting a prevalence  of 
underprediction errors (cols. 1 and 3). The absolute values of these statistics 
increase with the span in each case. Indeed, all the summary error measures, 
except SK and KU, show such increases,  as do the statistics for actual val- 
ues.” The means of the RMSEs are generally larger than the medians, and SK 
is greater than zero. The KU statistics are large in some cases, particularly for 
NFI (short forecasts) and SLGP. 
Combining the individual forecasts into group means reduces the RMSEs 
for each variable  and span, as can be seen by comparing column  1 of table 
1A.6 with column 6 (and a fortiori with col. 4) of  table 1A.5. At the lower 
quartile Q,, the RMSE ratios i/g are close to one throughout; the range of the 
median ratios is about 1.1-1.3,  and that of the Q,  ratios is 1.2-1.7.  The group 
mean forecasts perform best (the ratios are highest) for PCE and SLGP (see 
table 1A.6, cols. 2-4). 
Our BVAR forecasts have larger RMSEs than the NBER-ASA group mean 
forecasts 80 percent of the time, according to the paired entries in columns 1 
and 5 of table  1A.6. They are very poor for PCE and definitely inferior for 
FGP, whereas elsewhere the differences are much smaller (cf. cols. 1-4  and 
5-8). 
Consumer Price Inflation and Interest Rates, 1981-90 
Forecasters underpredicted CPI inflation just as they did IPD inflation (see 
the negative signs of the mean errors in table 1A.7, rows 1-5,  cols. 1 and 3). 
The RMSEs of these forecasts are discouragingly large compared to the de- 
scriptive statistics for the actual values (cf. cols. 4 and 6 with 1  1, in particu- 
lar).  Note  that  the  NBER-ASA survey questionionnaire  asked directly for 
forecasts of the level of CPZ  injution at an annual rate in the current quarter 
and the following four quarters (not for forecasts of  the CPI itself). 
In contrast, the forecasts of the three-month Treasury-bill  rate (TBR) had 
relatively small errors according to these comparisons (rows 6-10).  The fore- 
17.  A few deviations from the rule appear in the longest forecasts; they are apparently due to 
outliers and small-sample problems. 79  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
able 1A.6  Individual, Group Mean, and BVAR Forecasts of Percentage Changes in 
Consumption, Investment, and Government Components of Real GNP: 
Selected Comparisons, by Span, 1981-90 
RMSE Ratios 11s  RMSE Ratios iibv 
Group Mean  BVAR 






















































Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) 
.58  1.08  1.23  1.73  1.97  .31  .36  .48 
.79  1.12  1.22  1.41  3.78  .22  .24  .28 
.98  1.11  1.25  1.51  5.65  .20  .22  .27 
1.18  1.15  1.24  1.71  7.66  .I8  .20  .25 
I .47  1.10  1.27  1.66  9.37  .I8  .21  .24 
Nonresidential  Fixed Investment (NFI) 
2.01  1.10  1.19  1.34  2.23  .90  1.02  1.19 
3.43  1.03  1.11  1.26  3.64  .95  1.04  1.17 
4.99  1.04  1.12  1.26  5.31  .96  1.04  1.19 
6.89  1.00  1.06  1.22  6.83  .99  1.09  1.23 
8.69  .99  1.05  1.18  8.25  1.02  1.09  1.26 
~ 
Residential  Fixed Investment (RFI) 
3.01  1.05  1.26  1.45  3.97  .79  .97  1.21 
5.83  .96  1.25  1.43  5.24  1.10  1.30  1.80 
8.42  .94  1.21  1.41  8.33  .90  1.15  1.51 
10.63  .93  1.24  1.42  11.30  .80  1.02  1.35 
12.62  .96  1.15  1.45  14.64  .71  .98  1.23 
Federal Government Purchases (FGP) 
3.31  1.00  1.14  1.27  4.61  .72  .80  .95 
4.22  1.02  1.10  1.29  7.26  .59  .65  .82 
4.  I1  1.04  1.18  1.37  9.02  .50  .54  .66 
3.79  1.13  1.31  1.48  10.39  .39  .52  .63 
4.55  1.07  1.30  1.48  11.44  .44  .53  .65 
State and Local Government Purchases (SLGP) 
.61  1.14  1.23  1.51  .49  1.40  1.64  2.07 
.75  1.02  1.19  1.39  .82  1.09  1.44  1.62 
.9  I  1.00  1.17  1.27  1.20  1.11  1.41  1.60 
1.07  1.13  1.19  1.40  1.68  1.13  1.29  1.54 
I .35  1.01  1.13  1.30  2.18  1.04  1.28  1.53 
lore: On the symbols used, see previous tables and the text. Table 1A.7  Selected Measures of Forecast Accuracy and Actual Values: Consumer Price Inflation, the lkeasury- 
Bill Rate, and the Corporate Bond Yield, 1981-90 
Mean Error  Root Mean Square Error  Actual Value 
Target  M  SD  MD  M  SD  MD  SK  KU  M  SD  RMSV 
Row  Quarter  (I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Consumer Price Index, % Change (CPI) 
-.61  .47  -.SO  1.20  .39  1.08  .34  -  1.37  1.02  .54  1.16 
-.58  .48  -.46  1.18  .43  1.15  .I1  -1.41 
-.57  .50  -.46  1.20  .42  1.20  .I9  -  1.36 
-.53  .50  -.51  1.21  .38  1.26  .I0  -  1.50 
-  .51  .53  -.50  1.23  .39  1.24  .OO  -  1.41 






.03  .24  -.03  .49  .36  .40  2.50  8.01  8.38  2.48  8.74 
.I9  .49  .24  1.51  .51  1.52  .06  2.75 
.39  .68  .61  1.85  .50  1.80  .I1  .85 
.65  .59  .83  2.03  .56  2.23  -  1.55  2. I4 
1.05  .68  1.03  2.48  .71  2.62  -.42  1.09 






-.26  .30  -.24  .72  .35  .63  2.01  5.65  11.64  2.34  11.87 
-.OO  .48  .I2  1.59  .59  1.37  .66  -  .26 
.21  .61  .31  1.86  .49  1.81  .78  .5  I 
.39  .72  .58  2.05  .43  2.02  .39  -  .28 
.60  .74  .69  2.25  .66  2.36  .88  1.58 
Note: On the symbols used, see previous tables and the text. 81  Twenty-two Years of NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
Table IA.8  Individual, Group Mean, and BVAR Forecasts of Consumer Price Inflation, 
the Treasury-Bill Rate, and the Corporate Bond Yield: Selected 
Comparisons, by  Span, 1981-90 
RMSE Ratios i/g  RMSE Ratios i/bv 
Group Mean  BVAR,a 
Target  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q,  RMSE  Q,  MD  Q, 
Row  Quarter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Consumer Price Index, % Change (CPI) 
1  1  .53  1.01  1.03  1.12  .54  1.63  2.63  3.22 
2  2  .46  1.01  1.03  1.12  .74  1.02  1.63  2.29 
3  3  .48  1.01  1.03  1.18  .78  1.05  1.80  2.06 
4  4  .54  1.01  1.02  1.09  .80  1.07  1.63  1.79 
5  5  .58  1.01  1.02  1.08  .95  .92  1.36  1.59 
Treasury-Bill Rate, 3-month, % (TBR) 
6  1  .20  1.45  1.83  2.46  .96  .29  .38  .56 
7  2  .90  1.09  1.26  2.11  I .62  .59  .81  1.17 
8  3  I .38  1.02  1.31  1.54  2.03  .65  .80  1.08 
9  4  1.77  1.00  1.14  1.29  2.51  .68  .71  .94 
10  5  2.49  1.01  1.08  1.18  3.03  .67  .78  .95 
~~ 
Corporate Bond Yield, % (CBY) 
11  I  .38  1.17  1.57  1.81  .I7  .56  .77  .98 
12  2  .83  1.15  1.48  2.52  I .26  .72  .95  1.75 
13  3  1.24  1.09  1.25  1.74  1.74  .71  .92  1.25 
14  4  1.51  1.03  1.19  1.46  2.19  .69  .88  1.03 
15  5  2.42  .98  1.11  1.20  2.65  .60  .83  1.02 
Note; On the symbols used, see previous tables and the text 
casts of  the (new high-grade) corporate bond yield (CBY) were even more 
accurate (rows 1  1-15). 
Despite the already noted weakness of most of the individual CPI forecasts, 
the  corresponding group  mean  forecasts  perform  relatively  well.  Their 
RMSEs are considerably smaller than those of the BVAR model and less than 
half those of the average individual forecasts (cf. table 1A.8, rows 1-5,  and 
table 1A.7, rows 1-5,  cols. 4 and 6). The i/g ratios cluster close to one be- 
tween Q, and Q2,  which indicates that the forecasts concerned are remarkably 
alike. 
For the interest rates TBR and CBY,  combining the individual forecasts 
greatly reduces errors, but with notable exceptions at the most distant target 
quarter (5). Here the RMSEs are much larger for the BVAR than the group 
mean forecasts, and, correspondingly, the i/bv ratios are much lower than the 
i/g ratios (cf. table 1A.8, rows 6-15,  cols. 1-4  and 5-8). 82  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
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Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun (ZB) have produced an impressive paper 
on the record of macroeconomic forecasts and forecasting performance, prob- 
ably the most encyclopedic ever on this topic. The data set, while not without 
deficiencies, is rich in content, comprehensive,  and spans an unusually long 
period, 1968-90.  There is a representative enough sample of forecasters and 
a long enough time frame to promote confidence in the implications for fore- 
casts and forecasting performance suggested by the work. 
The macro variables covered were big and small (e.g., ranging from gross 
national product [GNP] to the change in business inventories), important and 
less so in the macro scheme of  things,  showed both  little and considerable 
variability, and presented a wide range of ease or difficulty in forecasting. The 
forecasters  sampled  and  forecasting  methods  used  represent  a  reasonable 
cross section of those who engage in macro forecasting, although classifica- 
tion of  the types of  forecasts and forecasters is difficult because of the mix in 
background and methods of the forecasters. 
One problem  with  the data was considerable variability  in the survey re- 
spondents,  over time and across individuals.  On average, the response rate 
was not very high and was quite variable. The number of respondents shrank 
dramatically in the 1980s compared with the 1970s. There was no systematic 
statistically based process for generating the observations used to calculate the 
results.  Inferences  drawn from so nonrandom  a sample, especially one on 
which distributional summary statistics are calculated,  may be more sugges- 
tive than confirmational and should be interpreted cautiously. 
ZB nearly  exhaust the possible range of questions about macro forecasts 
and macro forecasting, providing numerous insights on forecasting accuracy 
and performance  that can help  consumers  of economic  forecasts in under- 
standing what to expect from forecasts and forecasters. 
This Comment discusses several aspects of the ZB paper, drawing out what 
might be of interest to the historian of forecast performance, to the forecasting 
practitioner,  and to those who are consumers of macroeconomic forecasts. Of 
interest is what the forecasts of macroeconomic variables reveal about forecast 
accuracy, what forecasters can learn from past forecasting performance to help 
Allen Sinai is chief economist and president,  Lehman Brothers Economic Advisors, and ad- 
junct professor, Lemberg Program for International Economics and Finance, Brandeis University. 85  Twenty-two Years of  NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
forecasting in the future, and what consumers of macroeconomic forecasts can 
reasonably expect from forecasts and forecasters. A couple of  specific criti- 
cisms are separately treated. 
Forecasts and Forecasting Performance 
The ZB paper provides the most comprehensive and exhaustive survey of 
macroeconomic forecasts  presented  to  date.  The  sample period  covered 
twenty-two years with eleven variables from 1968:IV to 1981:II and seventeen 
through 19903, included a large number of forecasters, contained a variety of 
forecasting methods, involved numerous organizational sites from which the 
forecasts were made, and provided a varied, often volatile set of  macroeco- 
nomic conditions and events to forecast. Topics covered relative to forecasts 
and forecasting performance included accuracy (for specific variables and in 
general), the variability of  forecasts, near-term versus longer-run forecasts, 
“consensus” versus individual forecasts, and forecast performance (by orga- 
nization, by period, and by method). 
Some deficiencies of the data must be noted, however. How representative 
the sample of forecasts and forecasters is affects the validity of any inferences 
drawn. 
First, the sample generating the forecast observations was  not of  uniform 
size and composition in a cross-sectional or time-series sense. Nor was it ran- 
domly selected by  any sampling method. There were 86 respondents used in 
the period 1968:IV-1981:2. The mean number per survey, 40.8, was less than 
half the total. The standard deviation was 11.3, or 27.6 percent of  the mean 
for this subperiod, an indication of  considerable variability in the responses 
across surveys. The sample from 1981:III to 1990:I contained 29 individuals, 
only one-third the number in the prior subperiod, although the responses were 
more consistent. The mean number of respondents per survey was 17.2 and 
the standard deviation 3.3. 
Respondent participation was  not strong, with only 24.2 surveys per re- 
spondent, on average, out of 51 in 1968:1V-1981:11  and a standard deviation 
of  10.4, or 43 percent of the mean. The mean number of  surveys per respon- 
dent was 20.8 out of 35 but with a smaller standard deviation of 7.5, or 36.1 
percent of the mean. 
1.  McNees has summarized and presented the results of macroeconomic forecasts in numerous 
articles (e.g., McNees 1979, 1981, 1988; McNees and Ries 1983), but his sample generally has 
been limited to econometrics-based forecasts. Victor Zamowitz, and now Phillip Braun, has been 
collecting a large number of macroeconomic variable forecasts for the North-Holland publication 
Economic Forecasrs. Numerous forecasters are surveyed whose methods of forecasting vary con- 
siderably. This effort is fairly recent, but the data set will provide an excellent basis for analysis at 
some point. The Eggert Blue Chip Survey collects forecasts from about lifty-three forecasters who 
are based at different types of organizations and who use different methods to forecast. This could 
provide data useful for analyzing forecasts and forecasting performance if  it would ever be made 
available for that purpose.  The Wall Srreet Journal surveys fifty or so forecasters twice a year, 
publishing the results in early January and in early July, and has been doing so regularly since 
1981, This is yet another source of data on macroeconomic forecasts and forecasting performance. 86  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
A smaller sample of participants can produce greater variability in the vari- 
ous summary measures of  forecast accuracy, those for central tendency or 
spread. A wide dispersion of  forecasts would have a similar effect. How to 
correct for the variability of survey responses across time and of respondents 
by  survey is not clear. Means and standard deviations of  the individual and 
group mean forecasts are likely biased in such a situation. 
Second, certain differences between forecasters were not accounted for, nor 
were any adjustments made for the time spent in forecasting. Those who par- 
ticipated in a few surveys might not have been similar in interest to those who 
responded to many surveys or have had similar training, experience, or ability. 
“Part-time” forecasting, on average, probably produces less accuracy, “full- 
time” forecasting more,  and “commercially based’ forecasting perhaps the 
most accuracy. 
Third, coverage varied across individuals and over time, with turnover of 
participants high, again a problem for the drawing of inferences from the cal- 
culated results. 
Fourth, since the sample participants were largely from business but spread 
across other areas including finance, research and consulting, academic insti- 
tutions, government, and others, skill levels, possible influences of  the work 
environment on forecasting, and methods used could have been very different. 
Forecast comparisons need to correct for these factors. 
Fifth,  the forecasting method  most often identified was  “informal judg- 
ment.” This provided another sort of  heterogeneity in the sample since the 
informal judgment method of forecasting is amorphously defined and for at 
least some forecasters potentially a surrogate for an otherwise identifiable 
forecast method. 
Such features of the data probably bias the results more than if  each fore- 
caster exhibited a similar configuration of characteristics and the sample size 
were the same over time. Doubt is cast on the validity of  conclusions drawn 
because the sample may not have been representative of the population. The 
inferences claimed from the study must therefore be regarded as tentative and 
in need of further investigation. 
Any weaknesses of the data did not carry over into the assessment of fore- 
casting performance, however. ZB provide a complete and comprehensive set 
of  results and make a major contribution to the issue of  forecast accuracy, 
producing numerous insights and implications for practitioners and users of 
macroeconomic forecasts. 
A full range of summary measures of forecast performance is provided, for 
both short- and longer-run forecasts. Almost everything is there-mean  er- 
rors; marginal errors; mean absolute errors (MAEs); root mean square errors 
(RMSEs); measures of dispersion such as standard deviation, median, inter- 
quartile range, skewedness, and kurtosis; early quarter and late quarter fore- 
casts; group mean as consensus versus individual forecasts; levels and per- 
centage  changes;  zero-  to  five-quarters-ahead  forecasts;  Bayesian  vector 87  Twenty-two Years of  NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
autoregression (BVAR) forecasts; subperiod forecast assessment (1968:IV- 
1979:III and  1979:IV-1990:1);  Michigan (RSQE) model econometric fore- 
casts versus those from the NBER-ASA survey; Sims model (BVAR) fore- 
casts versus the NBER-ASA versus the Sims-Todd ARIMA-in  thirty-one 
tables of data and eight appendix tables, quite a collection of results! 
The analysis is also very complete, ranging over issues of absolute accuracy 
in forecasts of changes and levels; the effects of data revision on accuracy; the 
distribution of errors in the short run (current to one or two quarters out) and 
in the long run (as much as five quarters out); accuracy for major variables 
such as nominal GNP, real GNP, and inflation but also for other macroeco- 
nomic variables such as the unemployment rate, housing starts, capital goods 
spending, net exports, and certain interest rates; individual versus “consen- 
sus” or group mean forecasts; how well certain forecasters forecast certain 
variables; a comparison of forecasts before and after the big change of Federal 
Reserve policy  in  October  1979; econometric  model  performance of  the 
Michigan model versus the NBER-ASA; the NBER-ASA versus time-series 
methods such as BVAR, the Sims version of  BVAR, and ARIMA. 
Many of the conclusions drawn have been put forward before, for example, 
larger forecast errors the longer the forecast horizon and the superior perform- 
ance of  group mean or consensus forecasts relative to most individual fore- 
casts. The supporting evidence is more substantial in ZB than in other studies, 
however. 
Some results are new and interesting. There is new evidence particularly on 
the performance of  BVAR  and other time-series forecasting methods versus 
the NBER-ASA forecasts, which were mostly informal judgment. These rel- 
atively new methods of forecasting have been subjected to little evaluation, in 
terms of accuracy, relative to others such as informal judgment, econometrics, 
or the leading economic indicators barometric approach. The results from the 
BVAR approach of ZB were mixed, where two variants were used, one with 
an assumption of no current-quarter knowledge (variant A) and the other as- 
suming perfect foresight in the quarter (variant B). But the results appear 
promising enough to warrant additional examination of BVAR as an alterna- 
tive or supplemental macroeconomic forecasting tool. 
Other time-series methods, represented in models developed by  Christo- 
pher Sims and by Sims and R. Todd, BVAR- and ARIMA-type specifications, 
were analyzed for the major variables.  Some ARIMA forecasts of  Charles 
Nelson’s and Frederick Joutz’s were also evaluated. 
Here, the results were again mixed, with forecasts of some variables show- 
ing up relatively well against the NBER-ASA surveys and some not, depend- 
ing especially on whether the assumption was no current-quarter knowledge 
or perfect foresight. If  the former, the ARIMA comparisons were unfavor- 
able. If  the latter, the ARIMA comparisons were competitive. Consensus or 
group mean forecasts almost uniformly were superior to the ARIMA meth- 
ods, regardless of which type. The Sims BVAR results were competitive, sug- 88  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
gesting BVAR as a forecasting technique worth using,  if  only at least on a 
collateral basis. 
Group mean forecasts consistently did better than most individual forecasts 
and the various time-series methods of forecasting, not a new result, but one 
underscored and most impressive in ZB for the degree and widespread nature 
of the supporting evidence. This is a significant and important finding for both 
practitioners and users of macroeconomic forecasts. 
A few interesting  topics  were not  analyzed.  There  was no discussion or 
evaluation  of forecast  accuracy on cyclical turns.  ZB did not deal with the 
question of forecasting turning points in major variables. It would have been 
of  interest to see how the NBER-ASA forecasts did on turning points and in 
identifying the extent and length of downturns and expansions and to see how 
consistent forecasts  were across different cyclical episodes.  The  1970s and 
1980s were quite volatile,  in a business-cycle sense, with both endogenous 
swings and external shocks, policy and other, perturbing the economy more 
than usual. How macro forecasts did under such conditions could have been 
highlighted given the data available, would have been instructive on issues of 
accuracy, and would have been of interest to practitioners of forecasting. 
A useful historical analysis would have carefully examined the forecasts in 
periods after “shocks” such as the fourfold oil price increase of  1973-74  and 
the radical change of Federal Reserve policy in October 1979. 
A notion of rational expectations is that forecasts, especially those of econ- 
ometric models and implicitly others that use a structural approach, might not 
do well after a change in structure. Looking at forecast performance for a few 
years before and after the structural changes that occurred and across forecast- 
ing  methods  such  as econometric, informal judgment,  the  barometric  ap- 
proach  of  the  leading  economic indicators,  and  anticipatory  surveys could 
have provided a test of this rational expectations idea. 
A historical description of how the forecasts fared over business-cycle  epi- 
sodes, a la McNees (1988) and McNees  and Ries (1983), would  also have 
been of interest. This cannot be extracted from the tables, although it certainly 
exists in the ZB data set. 
Interesting also was the attempt at a before-and-after comparison of forecast 
accuracy where the new Fed policy (NFP) under Federal Reserve chairman 
Volcker constituted the dividing line between 1968:IV-l979:III  and 1979:IV- 
1990:I. Regardless  of  the  forecasting  method,  a worse performance  might 
have been expected in the period  1979:IV-l99O:I  than in  1968:IV-l979:III. 
The structure of the economy certainly shifted during the late 1970s and early 
1980s, at first because of oil price shocks and then because of the NFP. 
The period comparisons, eleven years each, were interpreted by ZB as not 
showing  any  significant  improvement  or worsening  of  forecasts  between 
them. But some of the ZB data do not support this assertion. Table 1.14 shows 
that, in the period  1979-90,  the individual forecasts were worse on nominal 
GNP, worse part of the time on real GNP, and better on inflation. The group 89  Twenty-two Years of  NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys 
mean forecasts were significantly  worse on nominal GNP, slightly worse on 
real GNP near term, and distinctly better on inflation. 
In any case, disaggregation over time, rather than the lumping together of 
so much experience into eleven-year subsamples, would be necessary if dif- 
ferences were to be assessed fully. Macro forecasting is a lot easier in expan- 
sion (e.g.,  the years  1983-88)  than  over  a shorter period  of  time such as 
1981-82,  which was characterized by a great deal of volatility. 
There is considerable averaging in the two eleven-year spans, perhaps wip- 
ing out or diminishing what might appear to be differences in forecasting per- 
formance  if  the specific episodes had  been  isolated for comparisons over a 
shorter span of time. 
Also of interest was the comparison of the NBER-ASA survey results with 
the  econometric  approach  to  forecasting  as  represented  by  the  Michigan 
model (RSQE) forecasts.  The Michigan model comparison with the NBER- 
ASA forecasts were unfavorable and did not support some earlier work that 
has indicated “model plus judgment” as superior to “judgmental” forecasting 
alone. The NBER-ASA survey showed about half or more of individual fore- 
casts to be at least somewhat more accurate than Michigan in the major vari- 
ables real GNP, inflation, and unemployment. 
The comparison of the NBER-ASA surveys with the Michigan model really 
does not put the econometric approach in the best light, however. The Michi- 
gan model was chosen principally because it had the longest forecast history 
of those methods that were econometrics based, matching better the span of 
the NBER-ASA  surveys. The more general system methods for macro fore- 
casting, pioneered by Lawrence R. Klein and the various Klein and Wharton 
models and by  Otto Eckstein  (1983) at Data Resources,  probably  were not 
well represented by the Michigan model. 
The National  Economic  Information  System, Eckstein’s  terminology,  is 
used more or less by many large-scale macroeconometric model builders, es- 
pecially commercial vendors, including Data Resources, Wharton Economet- 
ric Forecasting Associates (WEFA), Evans Economics, Lawrence Meyer and 
Associates,  and the Boston Company Economic Advisors.  It stresses inten- 
sive monitoring,  screening, and filtering of high-frequency data in the fore- 
casts of early periods,  typically  spends more time assessing and estimating 
exogenous  variables  and  policy  inputs,  and  applies  significant  numbers  of 
staff to the forecasting task. The National Economic Information System ap- 
proach also encompasses many more types of studies, simulations, and collat- 
eral research that feed into the macroeconometric forecasts than perhaps might 
be followed by Michigan. 
An interesting comparison would be to take macroeconometric model fore- 
casts including those of the Michigan RSQE, perhaps the data kept by Steve 
McNees from the NBER-NSF Model Comparison Seminars, and to compare 
the collective results of those forecasts over a sample period that matches a 
portion of the NBER-ASA  surveys. This would produce  a more useful  and 90  Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun 
informative comparison of the econometric approach with informal judgment 
(the NBER-ASA  survey) than ZB actually performed.  Group mean forecast 
comparisons between the two, NBER-ASA and econometrics based,  would 
provide the most instructive test. 
Presumably,  these  organizations  who  use  the  econometric  approach  in 
profit-making  enterprises ought to produce,  on average, more accurate fore- 
casts than the NBER-ASA survey. The fees paid by the market are supposed 
to reflect some added value, perhaps related to the accuracy of the forecasting. 
An important contribution of ZB was the notion of assessing accuracy rel- 
ative to the variability  of what is being  predicted,  an important point often 
neglected  in the evaluation of  forecasts and forecasting performance  and in 
model building.  Looking at forecast errors relative to actual changes or pro- 
spective changes, instead of actual levels, gives an idea of how much one can 
reasonably expect to forecast and a way to judge forecasts. Some variables are 
just inherently less easily forecast than others.  In such a situation, forecasts 
that miss more could actually be better than forecasts of variables that follow 
an easily predicted path, or more accurate, or more valuable for decisions. 
Some Lessons for the Forecasting Practitioner 
A few lessons or “messages” for forecasting practitioners  emerge from the 
ZB work. First, forecast errors grow larger the longer the time span of a pro- 
jection. All variables in the individual forecasts showed this property, as did 
also the  group mean or consensus  forecasts.  This is neither a lesson  nor a 
surprise, just a reaffirmation of how hard it is to make conditional forecasts of 
any variable  with  any method  going out a long period  of  time  because of 
events,  right-hand-side  variable  perturbation,  and  noise  between  the  time 
of  the forecast  and the time of the forecast realization.  The lesson  for the 
practicing forecaster is to forecast continuously or to develop systems that do 
so, monitoring external impulses and internal propagation mechanisms that 
might move variables of interest on a high-frequency basis. 
Second, there is the finding, very well documented in ZB, that group mean 
forecasts (consensus) outperform most individual forecasts. Combining fore- 
casts that come from different sources or that are generated by different tech- 
niques tends to produce significant gains in accuracy. This finding, at least in 
ZB, is accompanied by the notion that it is invariant to the forecast horizon 
and other time-series methods.  Some individual forecasts do better than the 
consensus,  about 25 percent of them for nominal GNP, real growth, and the 
implicit GNP deflator. For the practitioner who might use forecasts of inputs 
in his or her own forecast, this suggests averaging the sources of those inputs 
or generating several attempts at them by using different forecasting methods. 
Third, there is much evidence relating to comparisons between forecasting 
methods. The methods included those used in the NBER-ASA survey itself, a 
potpourri of methods that most in the survey indicated as informal judgment, 
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provided  by  Sims, the  Sims-Todd  ARIMA,  and  the  Michigan  model  (the 
“model-plus-manager’’  approach). The results (tables  1.26-1.3 1), measured 
by  average root mean  square error (ARMSE), tended  to favor the informal 
GNP approach represented by the group mean forecasts of  the NBER-ASA 
survey. Some time-series approaches performed impressively, particularly the 
Sims BVAR  (variant  B)  and the ZB form of the  BVAR  (variant B).  Other 
results were mixed, depending on the sample period and variables examined. 
The Michigan model generally did well in comparison with the various time- 
series methods. 
A lesson here is the running of BVAR forecasting models as a collateral 
system, using some current-quarter information. The BVAR results are worth 
noting. Establishing such systems as potential generators of  forecasts should 
be tried. The structural econometric model approach of the Michigan model 
showed favorably compared to most other methods except the group mean 
forecasts of the NBER-ASA. Along with  the NBER-ASA  and BVAR fore- 
casts, the  econometric  method  of  forecasting  ranked  well.  It  is  clear  that 
macroeconomic forecasting cannot yet be expected to produce better results 
through any “black box” approach, regardless of the technique. The ARIMA 
results tended to rank lowest. BVAR forecasting, although clearly worthy of 
use at least as a collateral  information input, consistently ranked below  the 
group mean forecasts of the NBER-ASA and did no better than the economet- 
ric approach. 
A fourth lesson relates to systematic under- or overprediction of macroeco- 
nomic time series. This is especially true of forecasts just after turning points, 
a topic not covered by ZB, with carryover in a time-series sense a prevalent 
characteristic.  This tendency  has  actually been  long known  in forecasting. 
The implication for forecasters is to adjust forecasts from knowledge of  this 
tendency, assuming that it will exist and persist.  Many users of  macro fore- 
casts adjust consensus forecasts with this in mind, particularly the projections 
of financial market participants. 
Fifth, judging accuracy by some standard of what is inherently characteris- 
tic of the series to be predicted is suggested by relating forecast changes to 
actual changes. If  there is a lot of  variability, then the standard for accuracy 
can be relaxed compared with cases where the variable being forecast has a 
smoother pattern.  Validation  in  model  building  and forecast evaluation  can 
make use of this notion. 
What Users of Forecasts Can Learn 
There is  much  in  ZB of  use  to consumers  of  macroeconomic  forecasts, 
who, in decision making, can make adjustments to the forecasts that are pro- 
vided in order to understand, interpret, and use them in a practical way. First, 
the cumulation of errors across the forecast horizon should make users skep- 
tical of long-term  forecasts, basically  disbelieving them,  and understanding 
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wrong word to describe long-run projections that are conditional on so many 
events that can change between the time the forecast is made and the realiza- 
tion. The long-run projections should be taken as scenarios or planning paths. 
Second, the use of consensus forecasts or averages from many sources can 
be a valuable informational input for planning. The superior accuracy of the 
group mean forecasts was impressive, widespread,  and one of the significant 
themes in the ZB paper.  Users of macroeconomic  forecasts should put this 
notion to good use, averaging the forecasts of individual forecasters as one 
information input or averaging projections generated by different methods of 
forecasting. However, the group mean results of the NBER-ASA survey did 
show that about 25 percent of the individual forecasts were superior to the 
consensus,  so it should be noted that significant value can be obtained from 
certain individual forecasts if accuracy is the main criterion. 
Third, while time-series models are perhaps a useful adjunct or alternative 
informational input, they do not seem to offer a great deal in terms of accu- 
racy. Users need to be skeptical of time-series or black box kinds of statistical 
projections.  At  the  same time,  an  informationally  dense  BVAR  approach 
seems worthy of note. 
Finally,  users  should  understand  the  systematic  nature,  either under-  or 
overprediction,  in macroeconomic  forecasts, documented by ZB, and incor- 
porate the systematic  serially autocorrelated  errors of  macroeconomic  fore- 
casts into planning. 
Some Additional Observations 
There are some myths in the ZB paper. One has to do with the notion that 
forecasting macroeconomic aggregates like real GNP and its components has 
less  potential  for  direct  profitability  than  forecasting  financial  variables.  I 
would not say this. In financial market work, there is room for the heavy use 
of forecasts of  macro aggregates and their components, not as financial vari- 
ables in themselves,  but as inputs that will drive financial markets in a pre- 
dictable way.  The macro aggregates also can have implications for inflation, 
monetary policy, the trade balance, and currencies. As an example, the Fed- 
eral Reserve drives markets through changes in short-term interest rates. Ac- 
tual interest rate forecasts can be irrelevant. Understanding what may happen 
to the inputs that affect Fed policy can be much more valuable.  Indeed, good 
forecasts of the macro aggregates can be more forward looking than the infor- 
mation contained in forecasts of  interest rates, making the macro input very 
important. Virtually all decision makers use macro aggregates as a backdrop 
for planning, implicitly or explicitly. 
A second mistaken notion relates to the assertion that the main value of the 
forecast lies in the ability to reduce uncertainty about the future faced by the 
user. Forecasts are a dime a dozen. Probably more valuable than a point fore- 
cast is a process that enhances understanding of the phenomenon being fore- 
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Conclusion 
The ZB paper is an important and significant contribution to the literature 
on macroeconomic forecasting, with  a valuable  set of  data, not  even  fully 
analyzed-and  not  without deficiencies-but  probably the best set of  data 
around. 
The ZB record of the history of  forecasting performance, insights into ten- 
dencies  from the forecasts, comparison of  the NBER-ASA informal  model 
results with other forecasting methods, and striking observations that averages 
of individual forecasts are more accurate than individual forecasts alone con- 
stitute a major contribution  of  a paper that carefully  uses a rich data set to 
provide a basic reference. The ZB contribution will be an essential reference 
document on macroeconomic forecasts and forecasting. 
References 
Braun, P., S.  Shishado, and J. Vuchelin, eds. Monthly. Economic forecasts: A monthly 
Eckstein, Otto. 1983. The DRI model of the US.  economy. New  York: McGraw-Hill. 
McNees, Stephen K. 1979. The forecasting record for the  1970s. New England Eco- 
. 1981. The recent record of thirteen forecasters. New England Economic Re- 
. 1988. How  accurate are macroeconomic forecasts? New England Economic 
McNees, Stephen K., and John Ries. 1983. The track record of  macroeconomic fore- 
worldwide survey. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
nomic Review (SeptemberiOctober),  33-53. 
view (September/October),  5-21. 
Review (July/August), 15-36. 
casts. New England Economic Review (NovemberIDecember), 5-18. This Page Intentionally Left Blank